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On  11  July  1994  the  Council  (Ecofin)  asked  the  Commission  to  'produ~e a 
progress report no later than the end of 1995 on the application of  Article 209a of  the EC 
Treaty'  which  enshrines  the  'principle  of assimilation'  and  aims  to  strengthen  'the 
principle of co-operation'. 
Subsequently, the Essen European Council on 9 and 1  0 December 1994 called on 
the Member States to  ·submit reports on the measures they are implementing to combat 
wastefulness and  the  misuse of Community resources', to  be  examined by the Council 
(Ecofin) in June  1995  and submitted to the European Council in December 1995. 
The reports were submitted for presentation to the Council (Ecofin) on 19 June. 
The Council concluded that subsequent action should proceed along three lines - national, 
Community  and  partnership  - to  increase  the  effectiveness  of protection  of the 
Community's financial  interests. 
The Cannes European Council (26 and 27 June) 'took note of the Member States' 
reports'  and  'requested  the  Commission  to  prepare  a  comparative  summary  for  the 
European Council  in Madrid'  and called on  \he Member States and all  institutions to 
persevere in the battle against fraud and waste'. 
The methods used 
The comparative analysis accompanying this document has been prepared on the 
basis  of the  national  reports.  It takes  stock  of progress  in  applying  Article  209a  on 
protection of the Community's financial interests and summarizes the measures taken by 
the Member States to combat the misuse of Community resources. 
The structure is the  logical sequel of the structure of the Article, which sets an 
objective (assimilation) to be attained and prescribes the means to be deployed to counter 
misappropriation  of Community  funds  (close  and  regular  co-operation).  The  very 
existence of the single market and the  transnational nature and dimension of financial 
/1-2 crime demand counter measures transcending the national  arena and  proceeding from 
enhanced partnership at Community level. 
To  ensure  that  national  reports  followed  a  standard  pattern  facilitating  the 
comparative summary, the Commission, as requested by The CoUilCil, devised a general 
layout to be used in preparing the national reports which was approved by the Council 
(Ecofin) on 20 February. 
.. 
By and large the Member States have adhered to the proposed layout. Even so, 
their reports are highly dissimilar. Some are only a  f~w pages long; the longest has 78 
pages. Above all, their content varies widely, as the emphasis is not placed on the same 
items. 
Some Member States highlight recent changes to  their anti-fraud  laws.  Others 
highlight the administrative organization and distribution of  functions in verifying the use 
made of funds.  Some were mort precise than others as to the results obtained from the 
action  taken  and  the  follow-up  to  checks  undertaken  or  observations  made  by  the 
European Court of  Auditors.  For example, VAT fraud was often left out even though the  . 
fact of having texts and information on VAT fraud  would allow a comparison of the 
methods of control and recovery for this tax with those of traditional own resources. 
The explanation may lie partly in the short time available to the Member States 
for carrying out an ambitious exercise. Those responsible for compiling the reports may 
' 
have found it impossible to gather all the requisite information and therefore concentrated 
on those items which struck them as particularly important. The Commission was unable 
to engage in the  dialogue with the  Member  States  which would  have  facilitated  the 
exercise and yielded  a~balanced set of  contributio~s. 
This analysis follows  the  scheme  suggested to  the Member States.  It contains 
comparative tables setting out the information to hand and revealing, a contrat:io, those 
areas where it was not possible to produce the summary. The utility of pursuing and 
amplifying  the  exercise  in  conjunction  with  the  Member  States  will  then  have  to 
investigated so that the fullest benefit of the analysis can be enjoyed. Tables are given at various places in this report tp summarize certain comparable 
J  )  \  •  •  ' 
categories of information taken from the natienal reports; they are designed to constitute 
an objective ·basis  for ,the  comparative analysis.  The  ~ommission has  endea~~ured to 
reproduce the national contribution; as faithfully a~ possible, ,but the .risk is that ther~ may 
be gaps in what is reproduced here. Readers seeking access to e;{haustive information on 
any  particular  point  are  accordingly  referred .  to  the  national  reports  annexed  to  this 
· summary report  . 
.  '. 
Each part  and section contains a commentary illustrating the points that appear 
.  \  .  '  . 
most significant. In addition, guidelines or avenues to  be explored reflecting the Ecofin . 
.  - '  -
Cou~cil's conclusions of July  1994 and June  1995. are  offered as  a means- of laying a 
· basis for  action to  pursue the  fight  against fraud .and  wastefulness and  to  improve the 
effectiveness of the  protection of the  Commu~ity's financial  interests, as  ·c~Iied for  at 
·Cannes. 
This synthesis is a resume of the comparative' analysis, highlighting the guidance 
...  \  .  .  . 
emerging from  them and  which the Commission intends to examine in response to the 
invitation ofthe European Council. to persevere in the battle against fraud with the utmost 
vigour. 
* 
*  * 
Part 1:  Compliance  with  the  .fintt. paragraph  of Article  209a of the 
Treaty  on ·~uropean U~ion (assimilationpri.nciple} 
( 
The first paragraph of Article 209a EC reads: 'Meti1ber States shall take the same 
measures to counter fraud affecting the financial  interests elf the Community as they take 
.  .  '  .  '  . 
.  ' 
to  counter fraud  affecting their own financial  interests'. 
This writes into the  Treaty the  principle of assimilation enunciated by  the Court  .  '  . 
;  - '• 
of .Justice  which  in  I9X9 specified the scope of the  first  parag~·aph of /\rti~lc 5 of'thc 
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/ Treaty  which  established  the · European  Community  by  declaring  Member  States'· 
obligations  to  penalize  infringements  of Community  law  ·under  conditions,  both 
procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to  infringements of 
nationat law of a  similar  natur~ and  importance  and  which,  in  any  event,  make  the 
penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive'.  The principles enunciated by the Court 
and by the Union Treaty, though not identical, overlap and amplify each other. 
The Member States' reports suggest that this is how they see their obligations and 
that they apply Article s- as interpreted by  the Court of Justice and Article 209a of the 
EC  Treaty  in  combination  with  each other.  Most of them  accordingly  cover both the 
measures they  have taken to  assimilate  fraud  against  the  Community's and their own 
financial  interests  and  the  effectiveness  of the  penalties  for  which  they ·have  made 
provision. 
1.1  Description of national provisions (regulatory provisions, organisation of  services) 
which satisfy the principle of assimilation 
This part aimed on the one hand to offer a panorama of national  instruments to 
combat fraud against the Community budget from two angles - prevention (provisions for 
checks) and enforcement (provisions for  penalties) and  on the  other hand to provide a 
description of the various ways in which their services are organized. 
l.l.l  Description and evolution of the legislation 
It has been found that preventive measures received little attention in  the national 
reports.  In  some cases they arc considered in  the sections relating to  the organization of 
services; in  others they arc  in  the section on the  law,  with  enumerations of instruments 
presented without further comment. In  most cases. howcver. thc  pn:ventive mechanisms 
are  simply ignored. 
The reports reveal that most Member States treat revenue and cxpcnJiturc through 
quite  separate  sets of rules.  The  rules  governing  resources  arc  usually  to  be  found  in 
specific instruments of tax or customs law. The rules governing fraud on the revenue side, 
II - 5 which  are  to  be  found  in  general  normative provisions,  only  rarely  make distinctions 
between different revenue categories. 
On the resource side, the assimilation principle for  enforcement purposes is not· 
appreciated  as  regards  revenue categories taken  individually  but  in  terms of the legal 
frameworks for the different resources and must therefore be seen in the broad sense as 
a  c~mparison between the  framework  for purely Community resources  (the traditional 
own resources) and for the national resources that provide the bulk of the revenue in the 
national budgets(V.A.T., excise). 
On the expenditure side, where the reports do  mention changes in the .law, they 
most commonly announce the creation of new specific offences of fraud  in relation to 
grants,  with  Community  expenditure  being  included.  It should  be  noted  that  the 
enforcement  of penalties  may  be  linked  by  the  Member  States  to  the  existence  of 
Community rules providing for specific obligations. 
Finally, in the item on historical background, money-laundering legislation, which 
provides a means of tracing money obtained fraudulently from the Community budget, 
was mentioned by some Member States. 
Progress in introducing the assimilation principle on the expenditure side has also 
to be considered in relation to the effectiveness of measures taken on the revenue side. 
The existence of areas of distortion in the efficacy of both prevention and enforcement 
(administrative and criminal  penalties) should  be  highlighted  so  that standards can be 
raised where they are visibly lowest. 
Several Member States state that their general criminal law is  adequate to give 
effect to the assimilation principle in legal terms.  Most Member States believe that the 
ordinary criminal offences are adequately defined to protect the Community's financial 
interests. Assimilation for enforcement purposes is implied in provisions creating offences 
and penalties that are applicable  in  like  manner to  Community and  national  interests. 
Even so,  it is clear from  some of the  reports that there is  trend towards making fraud 
against the Community's financial  interests an offence in its own right. 
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The trend has gathered' momentum with the Convention on the protection of the 
Co~unity's  financial interests on which an agreement was reached at Cannes and which 
was signed on 26 July 1995. 
The objective to be achieved for some Member States in addition to assimilation 
remains  the  general  raising  of the  level  of protection  throughout  the  Community. 
Differences in schemes of  penalties, whether administrative or criminal, are likely to lead 
to  fraudst~rs moving their oPc:rations to the areas where enforcement is the least severe. 
The comparative analysis highlights that only part of the data has been gathered 
'  . 
~d  that some complementary iaformation in partic1.1lar on the prevention aspect would 
prove useful in consolidating the basis on which the fight against fraud and wastefulness 
must  be  waged  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of the  European  Council  of Cannes. 
Consolidation of information in this area is  a fundamental  requirement if the objective 
set by the European Councils of Essen and  Cannes of combatting fraud with the utmost 
vigour and persevering with the action necessary to raise the level of protection of the 
financial interests of the Community  is to be achieved.  On the basis of this assessment 
and the information gathered it is possible to perceive a number of guidelines whereby 
the objectives set by the Council may be achieved. 
Avenues to be exploftd (point 1.1.1) 
What  is  clear  from  this  initial  stage  of the  comparative  analysis  is that most 
Member States have preferred the differentiated approach to the revenue and expenditure 
sides.  This  situation of fact  raises  questions as  to  the degree  of assimilation of rules 
governing expenditure and revenue and their respective degrees of efficacy.  Finally, the 
question arises as to bow to achieve the objective set by the European Council. 
AI In aiming for  a coherent and global  approach to the protection of financial 
interests,  the  question  must  be  put  as  to  whether  this  difference  in  the  level  of 
harmonisation can be justified.  Perhaps, up to this point, insufficient  account has been 
taken of the similarity in the actions and resources used by organised financial crime in 
attacking the Community budget in both the revenue and expenditure areas.  This view 
is undoubtedly equally valid for the prevention aspect which remains an area not yet fully 
A-7 analysed.  This  falls  in  line  with  the  wish  for  regular assessment of national  control 
systems expressed in some reports. 
B/ Regarding administrative penalties, the reports suggest that national provisions 
are more sophisticated on the revenue side than the expenditure side.  A clear policy of 
tougher administrative penalties on the expenditure side is an obvious necessity. It might 
be based on the common guideline adopted by the Council on 29 June 1995, in particular 
with regard to setting up schemes of penalties in the different areas of expenditure. 
0  The Convention on protection of the  Community's financial  interests in the 
Member States, once transposed into national law, will provide the legal tool which the 
Member States need  for creating a specific offence.  Rapid attainment of this objective 
would  generate  a practical  possibility  of prosecuting  individuals  committing  the  acts 
specified  by  the  Convention.  Progress  here  would  lay  an  effective  basis  for  the 
Community institutions and the Member States to  mobilize all the resources needed for 
uniform enforcement throughout the Community. 
D/  In addition to the question of the definition of the offence itself, the further 
question  is  raised  in  some  reports  of harmonizing  the  levels  of penalties.  Excessive 
variations produce areas of tougher and  lighter enforcement and deflect business flows 
towards the "softer"  Member States.  The levels of penalties should therefore be more 
homogeneous to  achieve  satisfactory  assimilation and  guarantee  equivalent protection 
throughout the Union territory. 
1.1.2  Brief description of depanmental organization 
·Alongside the traditional control  bodies,  most Member States specify that they 
have  specific  investigation  structures  and  some  also  mention  the  existence  of 
multidisciplinary bodies with extended powers responsible for the control of all public 
funds, thereby including the protection of Community finances. 
Some Member States have specific structures responsible for all own resources. 
These  structures  are  sometimes  directed  more  particularly  to  investigation  and  fraud 
pJ;"evention.  In general, the Member States highlight the existence of a serious level of 
A-s protection of Community own resources ensuring a high degree of assimilation with the 
. protection of their national finances. 
For the Structural  Funds,  the  description of administrative bodies o,utstrips  the 
structures  charged  with  both  internal  or  external  checks  and  it  would  be  extremely 
dangerous  to  compare  the  Member  States'  systems  of management  of the  Structural 
Funds.  .  Three  special  features  may  be  discerned.  On  the  ~ne hand,  internal  controls 
(accounting,  ~ocumentary) carried  out  by  the  body  responsible  for  implementing 
Community programmes are predominant.  On the other hand, the  I~  administration 
has an often important autonomy which must be taken into account by the central State. 
This may result in a wide complexity and diversity of control systems in the Structural 
Funds.  Finally,  the  participation  of Member  States'  authorities  in  the  financing  of 
structural  programmes  achieves  de  facto  assimilation  which  is  easy  to  demonstrate. 
Numerous reports mention the existence of  external controls carried out by control bodies 
with very broad competence (Court of Auditors, inspection bodies). 
Avenues to be explored (point 1.1.2) 
/ 
The Commission draws two main conclusions from this comparative analysis of 
the national organizations for fraud prevention. 
AI Theil' is a trend towards the development of  multidisciplinary control structures 
with responsibility for all areas of fraud prevention and with wide-ranging investigative 
powers.  In this way the Member States hope that more effective steps can be taken to 
combat organized  financial  crime  which  is  not necessarily  confmed  to  one  particular 
sector. 
This  trend  is  interesting  in  that  it  indicates  how  national  measures  are  being 
adjusted to combat national and Community fraud which is not confined to one particular 
sector.  It takes account of the special nature of fraud  prevention, which requires long, 
specialized inquiries, calling for very special operational methods and the implementation 
of significant countermeasures not available to all authorities. 'Such inquiries can hardly 
be undertaken by those responsible for routine controls, let alone those responsible for 
the administrative side, that is, those whose main task is to implement a programme of 
A-9 expenditure.  Inquiries  of this  kind  must  be  undertaken  by  departments  with  wide 
territorial powers and specialist investigators who  can establish operational links with 
their colleagues in other Member States and with the Commission's fraud prevention staff. 
B/ As  regards the  administrative  organization of fraud  prevention,  the national 
reports  indicate on the whole that there  is  a great contrast  between the protection of 
revenue and the protection of  expenditure.  Where revenue is concerned, customs and tax 
authorities  have  had  long  experience  of fraud  prevention  and  apply  to  Community 
revenue  the same  control  methods as  have  proved their  worth  in  decades of use  at 
national level.  Both national and Community revenue may thus be said to enjoy a high 
level of P,rotection. 
Where expenditure is concerned, the "assimilation" principle is observed in that the 
protection  available  to  Community  expenditure  is  the  same  as  that  for  national 
expenditure.  The nlles ·  ~n public accounts, which protect government spending in all 
Member States, also .apply to Community spending, the great bulk of  which is channeled 
.  .  .. 
through the national budgets.  The protection given to Community interests in this else 
is, however, less atisfactory than the protection given to revenue.  The organization of 
controls  is  often  the  resJX?nsibility  of  the  fund  administrators  themselves  or  of 
departments w~ch  are I'Cflatiyely Unfamiliar. With.'the ·  teehniques for combating organized 
crime.  According to' the na~i.onal reports, controls tend to be the responsibility of  bodies 
whose work involves the general auditing of  government departments and the verification 
.  . 
of accounts rather than detailed checks on Community expenditure. 
There appears to  be room  for  specific  fraud-prevention  controls  carried out by 
specialists in the fight against o~ganized financial crime, who should be independent of 
the officials administering funds and should hold wide-ranging powers of investigation. 
If  the controls applicable to expenditure could be  raised to the level of those currently 
applied to revenue, the protection of both national and Community finances would be 
considerably enhanced. 
A-to 1.2.  Assessment of measures taken 
The objective pursued by the Commission is not.only to establish a panorama of the 
systems used by the Member States in the application of Article 209 A (texts applicable, 
organization of services) but also to assess the results of the measures adopted. 
1.2.1  Intelligence, control and investigation meutlfts 
It is to be noted that only half the Member States have supplied statistics on chec~ 
undertaken.  Given the difficulty  in gathering these statistics and the tigl;ltness  of the 
deadlines set, the figures supplied are  generally incomplete without any accompanying 
analysis.  The  improvement  in  the  level  of the  quality  of. the  controls,  when  it  is 
mentioned, . is  not  based  on  actual  figures.  If reference  is  sometimes  made  to 
administrative  and  judicial  enquiries,  neither  the  difference  nor  the  link  between 
traditional controls and enquiries is developed.  · · 
Some reports insist on the international dimension of fraud and. emphasise that a 
strictly national fraud network has never 9een uncovered. 
Interest  in  risk  analysis  based  on  intelligence  i~  when  indicated  mentioned  in 
counterbalance to quantitative controls  .. 
1.2.2  Results: fnauds  and irregularities detected (statistics, case study, typology) 
The Member States have endeavoured to provide significant quantitative elements 
(statistics).  On the other hand, the two other tltemes covered in this point (case study, 
typology) have been dealt with too succintly for any useful results to emerge from their 
analysis.  The relation between the number of controls and the number of irregularities 
discovered is only made exceptionally and only in the agricultural field. 
The case which has to be taken in analysing figures on frauds discovered is well 
known.  Assessments made may indicate an improvement in the notification of statistics 
or an increase in the activities of the anti-fraud services or a growth in the phenomenon 
itself.  It is only  with hindsight that comparative data on fraud  cases can be usefully 
A-Il examined.  Some Member States have attempted to identify certain risk sectors but the 
production of relevant typology at Community level requires a detailed examination of 
homogeneous information which goes beyond what is shown in the periodic regulatory 
notifications. 
The  production  of meaningful  typology  requires  the  gathering  of specific 
information on actual  anti-fraud problems  in  particular those of a transnational nature 
which may  involve organised crime so as to  adapt approaches and· strategy to  what is 
actually needed  to  protect the  financial  interests  of the  Community.  In this  way  the 
Member States and the  institutions could set up and have at their disposal .  operational 
instruments to d,eal with current problems. 
Analysi~ based on what is happening on the ground will have to  be in-depth and 
systemised by the Commission and the Member States acting in concert if  we are to  be 
in a position to direct the action to  be taken in such a way  as to  take· account of the 
demands linked to the particular dimension and development of the phenomenon to be 
curbed. 
1.2.3  Results: f111811Cial  impact 
In terms of assimilation, recovery of Community funds must be carried out with 
the same vigour as national· funds, a matter which the reports fail to confirm.  With the 
occasional exception, the texts which show preferential treatment to public creditOrs are 
not mentioned and it is not therefore possible to establish if the Community creditor is 
treated on an equal footing with the national creditor. 
Questions on recovery procedures have therefore neither been fully answered nor 
in a uniform manner.  The question of  the link between services responsible for recovery 
and those responsible  for investigation is not· dealt with.  The link would facilitate the 
financial follow up at CQmmunity level to enable the  Commis~ion to provide support. 
To avoid any discrimination in the settling of  debts, the limitation periods and rules 
for their suspension should be harmonised and improvements should be effected in the 
way  in  which  mutual  assistance  arrangements  for  recovery  matters  are  carried  out. 
;4·12 Likewise,  the  rules  for  setting  up  and  enforcing  guarantees  should  be  specified  and 
harmonised. 
Cross checks between Member States of  entry or departure and Member States of 
final  destination or of departure must be used  to advantage to ensure a better ov.erall 
functioning  of external  border controls.  In  this  perspective,  all  the  potential u5es  of 
mutual assistance in customs, agriculture and own resources must be exploited. 
In  general,  the  links  between  control  and  investigation  services  and  those 
responsible for recovery should be developed. .The Member States have certainly in most 
cases mentioned a service responsible for  recovery procedures.  However, ·this service 
should  know the outcome of any investigation as early as possible.  Failing this, frauds 
and irregularities ate updated but the implementation at a late stage of  binding procedures 
does not allow the money to be recovered (limitation periods, debt settlement). 
As for compounding the amounts involved, the Commission has not always found 
the principle of the impossibility of compound action to be confinned but rather items 
in  the  description  likely  to  cause  confusion  between  compounding  of the  amounts 
involved and compounding of penalties. 
1.2.4  Follow up meas~s  given to cues of fmud and inegularity 
Nationtd and Community administrative penalties 
The  Member  States  have  only  supplied  few  indications  on  these  questions 
(competent authorities, number of cases ... ).  A wide variety of situations is to be found 
in the field of national administrative penalties with the result that there is no  general 
system  for  them  in  the  Member  States.  In  most  cases,  penalties  are  used  for  the 
protection of revenue.  Too great a disparity may be avoided by developing the use of 
Community administrative penalties and moving towards greater homogeneity in national 
administrative penalties,  including on a systematic basis the protection of Community 
expenditure. 
Criminal penalties 
.. On the basis of the available information, no truly homogeneous comparison can 
be made.  A number of  reports agree on the need for the use of  more effective statistical 
tools for the  follow up of proceedings.  This  would enable the  outcome of criminal 
proceedings (case closed, compounding, prosecution, convictions, recovery etc.) to  be 
monitored and to ensure that the budgetary authority, which rightly demands this type of 
information, is correctly informed.  Analysis must therefore be developed on this aspect. 
Rellltiomhlp between lldmini.stmJive and  judi~illl pi'OCeedings 
Some  national  reports  justify  the  coexistence  of administrative  ~d criminal 
penalties  whic~ fulfil  different  functions,  the  latter penalizing  serious  action and the 
former  ensuring  sound  financial  management  by  the  Community.  However,  the 
parallelism of proceedings and cumulation of penalties do not preclude the precedence 
of the judge.  Little information is  given on the  connection between preliminary and 
judicial phases in the national reports.  The objective is to optimize the use of means 
available in the criminal area in the fight against fraud.  It is interesting to mention on 
this point that some Member States have raised in th~ part on co-operation the particular 
importance which they attach to the organization of collaboration between the services 
working in the preliminary and judicial stages: 
Rqel"'tll of  case to jiMiciol authorities 
Some Member States have an obligation to refer cases to their judicial authorities 
while  others prefer  compounding.  However,  statistical  data  is  absent  from  national 
reports. 
There is only one area in which, on the basis of  the national reports, some elements 
of a comparative approach may be traced, that is the principles for compounding in the 
field  of traditional  own resources.  Compounding  in expenditure  is  not covered.  In 
Member States which do_ not use compounding, knowledge of  an offence leads to judicial 
action being started. 
As in the other parts of the report, little mention is made of V  .A. T. in the part on 
compounding.  Two Member States confirm its use in the same conditions applying for 
.A-14 traditional own resources therefore achieving assimilation of treatment for two types of 
. Conuntlnity resources. 
The small number of specific replies found in the national reports docs no~ enable 
any judgment to be made on the use of compounding with regard to the principle of 
assimilation.  It is impossible to conclude that Community resources and expenditure are 
subject to the same compounding procedures as national resources and expenditure.  It 
can only be  s~n that it is necessary  to improve transparency both on the prinCiples, 
conditions of application and the extent of compounding.  In the  ligh~ of the results of 
the  specific  study  under  way,  the  Commission  will  return  to  this  problem  of 
compounding,  in  particular  from  the  aspect  of the  principle  of assimilation  and 
effectiveness of systems of penalties, both in the administrative and penal area. 
With regard to the Commission's role in the event of criminal proceecliDgs, some 
reports mention that it can participate in cases by indicating  either that it never uses this 
possibility or that it ought to  use  it more frequently.  Others mention the role of the 
national Treasury for  asset compensation in representing the financial  interests of the 
/ 
Community in criminal cases.  This point should be analysed in greater depth.  For the 
rest, the initiatives which the Commission could bring about are limited to the area of 
providing support in the detection and demonstration of  the facts of a fraud which is the 
subject of a criminal case. 
Avenues to be explored (1.2) 
This part devoted to the results achieved in the fight against fraud is based on the 
practice  put  in place  by  the  budgetary  authority  (the  European  Parliament)  and  the 
Commission.  It is a question of using to  best effect actual knowledge on the ground, 
based  on infonnation gathered  and  the  examination of typical  cases.  Questions of 
principle are highlighted before deciding on the type of  action to be undertaken to reduce 
the risk of fraud  .. 
Consideration  of these  results  gives  a  first  idea  of the  level  of assimilation. 
Improvements in the standard of information are however required.  It is impossible to 
judge the  concrete  application  of Article  209  A  (EC)  without  the  relevant  data  for 
.A-15 . 
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analysis (results of checks  and  investigations,  follow  up  action on cases established, 
recovery of sums due, administrative and judicial penalties).  To complete analysis and 
provide  guidelines,  comparable  figures  of homogeneous  items  are  needed  (rates  of 
recovery of  different revenue and expenditure, the number and amounts of  compounded 
cases, the numbers of checks and detailed investigations) relating to both national and 
Community financial interests. 
From its analysis, the Commission is able at thjs stage of  the study to deduce three 
guidelines. 
'  AI To facilitate the direction of  its actions and their planning as close to the reality 
on the ground, the level of  detail, the extent and the homogeneitY of  the information. must 
be  improved  at  all  practical  stages.  The  degree  of assimilation of the  Community's 
fmancial  interests  wiil  therefore  be  more  appropriate  and  the  rapprochement  to  be 
achieved at national level will be facilitated . 
.. 
The  inf(mnation.  mechanisms  and  the  harmonisation  of the  elements  to  be 
communicated must be  improved.  It is  a question for  the  Commission of being in a 
position to  develop  "the  exploitation  of intelligence"  so  as  to  make  best use  of the 
information at CommunitY  level, direct  anti'~fraud activities and  strategy, develop risk  .  .  . 
analysis and fmally be capable of proviping the budgetary Authority with all the details 
on the follow up of an investigation. 
B/ In certain areas, improvements will not only be able to be achieved by means 
of a rapprochement at Community level of.national practices.  This applies in particular 
to control schemes and risk analysis methods so that an equivalent level of monitoring 
throughout Community territory is achieved, to recovery rules (limitation and interruption 
in limitation, interest for late payments, recovery by means of  compensation .. ),  to public 
Treasury privileges applying to Community debts and to administrative penalties and the 
conditions in which they  are  applied.  A  strong  and  constant Community  impetus  is 
indispensable  to  achieve  such  progress  and  transpose  it  in  concrete  fonn  into  the 
appropriate framework. 
A·t6 CJ  The wish for simple and effective regulations also emerges from the national  .  . 
contrib~tions.  Major financial crime slips more comfortably into the labyrinth and maze 
.  . 
of  over complex regulations which paradoxically provide less protection for operators of 
good faith: for whom they. can be source of errors and omission.  The priority actions 
undertaken by the Commission to raise the level and quality of  the control of  Community 
fmances coincide broadly  with these objectives.  The wish expressed by certain Member 
States' to conduct regular national audits to assess national control systems could provide 
the support: and the appropriate framework to enable significant progress to be made in 
the field of simplification and effectiveness of texts  . 
. 
· i.3  Action to follow up Court  .~r Auditor's reports 
The European Councils of  Essen and Cannes requested the Member States and the 
institutions to set  up  a  base  on  which  to  fight  fraud  relentlessly.  The comparative 
analysis of  the action taken to follow up the reports of the Court of Auditors, mentioned 
in the Essen declaration, seemed to be a useful complement in carrying out this exercise. 
The  information  supplied,  ':"hile  insufficient  to  carry  out  a  true  comparative 
analysis, does nevertheless allow the existing convergences between the follow .up of  the 
.  .  . 
Court's recommendati'ons, the Commission's missions and the Member States' tasks in the 
. field of protection of Europe's financial interests to be emphasised. 
AvenUes to be explored (point 1.3) 
In accordance with the Essen mandate, the institutions and the Member States must 
endeavour to follow up the recommendations of the Court which represent a useful tool 
in improving fuumcial management. 
The achievement of this  objective could undoubtedly  be taken into account in 
national audits undertaken on a periodic basis to ensure the reliability of  national control 
systems.  Some Member States who  already  do  this  have  suggested the practice  be 
repeated in all Member States. 
,A-17 Some of the approaches which the  Commission intends to use to strengthen its own 
financial management could easily fit  into the same partnership framework. 
Part ll:  Application  of  article  209A,  second  paragraph  (co-
opemtion) 
The obligation ~or the Member States to combat fraud which results from the first 
paragraph of article  209A  is  amplified  by  a provision  of the  treaty  mentioned  in  its 
second paragraph with the aim of implementing with the help of the Commission close 
and  regular  co-operation.  To  counter  the  financial  crime  which  is  developing  in  an 
organized manner and which has targeted the Community budget, improved co-operation 
must be established and  function  on  a regular basis.  It is  in  this perspective that the 
Commission set up  the Advisory Committee for the Co-ordination of Fraud Prevention 
(COCOLAF) which is  the  appropriate body to  organize this collaboration between the 
competent services. 
2.1.1  Administrative  co-operation  and  assistance  on  the  basis  of  non-Community 
instruments 
The  information  notified  is  not  always  comparable  but  does  show  that  the 
instruments of co-operation between Member States are  not left unused.  Co-operation 
with third countries is sometimes the aim although this does not result strictly speaking 
from article 209  A. 
Avenues to  be explored  (2.1.1) 
This type of co-operation which exists for the protection of national finances is a 
means of improving assimilation and making the protection more homogeneous.  From 
an examination of the information provided, some guidelines emerge to direct the action 
to be carried out at Community level and improve the effectiveness of  these mechanisms 
AI Several reports recognize the need to  develop co-ordination and co-operation 
between Member States.  There is a need for a more structured ~a-operation at this level 
A-•s '.· 
where  it does  not already  exist.  It is  necessary  to  broaden and  increase  the  existing 
regulatory structu~e for co-operation to achieve the level of  collaboration required by E. C. 
article 209A.  Within this framework, a common solution could be sought to resolve the 
. 
different  grievances  with  the  mutual  assistance  mechanisms  (deadlines  for  answers, 
insufficient justification for the requests). 
B/ It is  also  necessary  to  improve  the  operational  links  between  the  services 
responsible  for  prosecution of serious  and  complex  fraud,  involving  major organized  .. 
financial crime, as well as the links between these same services and the Commission for 
transnational fraud cases where the current framework is inadequate.  This supposes the 
implementation  of procedures  to  develop  the  assistance  which  the  Commission  may 
supply to these services to realize these missions. 
C/ The development of personal contacts, exchanges of officials, liaison officers, 
seems an equally effective means of achieving progress with co-operation between the 
Member States.  In addition to the instruments in which contacts between experts must 
be legally introduced (to be implemented over time) the importance of results from co-
operation depends in fact also on the quality of relations between the investigators and 
other officials. 
D/ It is  ~ppropriate to examine the question raised by several Member States as to  . 
whether the  Commission should continue  or intensify  its  work on concluding mutual 
assistance agreements with third countries. 
2.1.2  Co-openation in criminal matten 
The provisions hiid down in paragraph 2 of  ~.C. Article 209A are not limited to 
purely administrative co-operation.  This paragraph also calls on the Member States to 
set up a broader co-operation if that proves to be necessary to combat fraud, in particular 
if the latter takes the form of organized cross border crime. 
Indeed,  organized crime must not be allowed to take advantage of disparities in 
judicial treatment to organize  its  own  immunity.  The  need  for  a thorough, effective,  . 
A·t9 direct and rapid co-operation is clear from the national reports even if this necessity is 
not always clearly set out. 
Although few reports have dealt with these subjects exhaustively, it is to be noted 
that police co-operation is not clearly distinguished from judicial co-operation.  Several 
national reports highlight the usefulness of  administrative co-operation, from the stage of 
the preliminary investigations to exchange information, on an institutional basis with the 
other Member States and the Commission and very concrete proposals are put forward 
to strengthen co-operafion on penal matters such as for example the possibility of  giving 
comparable powers to national investigators. 
Avenues to be explored (2.1.3) 
The items of information available show that it is imperative to make available to the 
national authorities responsible for enforcement effective means to respond to the need 
for an improved and  a homogeneous protection of the Union's finances. 
AI To improve co-operation between the competent national authorities on the one 
hand and between the latter and the Commission on the other hand, it is necessary to 
develop, from the point where initial investigations commence, exchange of information 
between the preventive services in the Member States and the competent services of the 
Commission.  To this end, the  Commission will  continue its work and consider the 
possibility of achieving a legal instrument which is likely to extend co-operation to all 
the operational activities which precede the opening of  judicial proceedings. 
B/ It would be useful to continue the examination of the resources and the control 
powers of the officials responsible for fraud prevention and to consider the possibility, 
advocated in certain reports, of  giving control powers comparable to those enjoyed by all 
national investigators. 
C/ To ensure that all the elements resulting from Community action carried out in 
co-operation with the Member States are taken into account, in particular with regard to 
prosecution, it is also necessary to examine the role of  the Commission and its activities 
A- 20 '.· 
with  national  authorities  and  to  draw  the  conclusions  in  terms  of regulations  to  be 
adapted. 
D/ In the field of criminal law, the measures necessary for the effective entry into 
force of the Convention on penal protection of the financial interests of the Community 
must be adopted as quickly as possible.  This first step must, to achieve its full effect, be 
extended with the setting up of improved and direct judicial co-operation at Union level 
targeted at the protection of the financial  interests of the Community built in particular  .. 
on networks of magistrates and/or prosecutors.  The  setting up of such networks will 
facilitate the application of the principle recognized in the Convention for  centralizing 
proceedings in one jurisdiction. 
2.1.3  Administrative  co-operation  and  mutual  assistance  under existing  Community 
instruments 
Community  regulations  setting  up  co-operation  between  the  Member  States  in 
agriculture, own resources or structural actions foresee an obligation on the part of each 
Member  State  to  provide  mutual  assistance  on  their  own  initiative  without  the 
Commission necessarily being involved. 
It seems that even if the Community co-operation instruments are used and most 
Member  States  have  produced  a  satisfactory  report  on  this  tyPe  of co-operation, 
difficulties exist with regard to deadlines for replies which may slow down investigations 
\ 
and enforcement action.  At the same time, all sorts of disparities (administrative, legal, 
technical) obstruct circulation of information between the Member States. 
The  suggestions~  put  forward  to  1m prove  ~his  type  of co-operation  are  quite 
numerous and show the interest which the Member States attach to it.  The Commission 
is obliged to  provide its assistance in accordance with the second paragraph of article 
209A.  It must be in a position to exploit the  existing~potential tools of co-opemtion or 
to adapt them for this need. 
)- 21 Avenues to be explored (2.1.3) 
The panoply  of existing  instruments at  Community  level  is  not  ignored  by  the 
Member States even if the potential for co-operation seems not to be fully used.  Given 
the central role of co-operation recognized by all the Member States, the objective to be 
pursued must be to develop existing mechanisms to raise their level of effectiveness and 
usefulness. 
AI The information systems must  evolve and  be  adapted to take account of the 
reality of certain constraints such as the level of  priority, the presentation of infonnation 
and the appreciation of  risk.  The bodies responsible for the functioning of  these different 
co-operation instruments  must  quickly  consider these  questions  to  define clearly  the 
needs  and  introduce  appropriate  rules  (adaptation  of texts,  production  of procedural 
guides, guides for access to  notifications, methods of co-operation, production of files 
especially at central level). 
B/ Certain  forms  of co-operation  highlighted  in  the  national  reports  must  be 
explored and developed such as for example the organization of  follow up action on cross 
checks  on  goods  in  free  circulation.  Holding  regular  meetings  between  competent 
services as  well as  rapid organization of ad hoc  meetings for  urgent and  serious cases 
must be encouraged.  The development of databases including information on economic 
operators  (risk  criteria)  advocated  by  some  Member  States  which have  established  a 
central register (or who suggest it) must be examined at Community level. 
C/ Mutual assistance on recovery must be made more effective.  The directive on 
these  mechanisms  must  be  adapted  to  the  needs  of the  single  market  by  giving  the 
Member  States,  which  are  alone  responsible  for  recovery,  the  legal  means  and  the 
necessary information to accomplish their mission.  The potential for mutual assistance 
in  agriculture,  customs or own  resources  should  be  better exploited  by  involving  the 
Commission systematically as soon· as an area of Community interest such as recovery 
arises.  This interest may moreover be of a fundamental  nature when a revelatory case 
is discovered showing the way a particular fraud  has  been organized (a textbook case) 
which must not be repeated in other parts of the Union territory . 
.A· 22 ~I  It is generally appropriate to ensure a full and proper application of Community 
regulati.ons ·  on co-operation. · The  Advisory Committee for  the Co-ordination of Fraud 
Prevention (COCOLAF)  in  its  s,Pecialist  format  must meet  regularly  to  assess results, 
identify  ~e· possibilities  of the  system  and,  if necessary,  determine  rules  for  both 
presentation and level of detail of institutional co-operation with regard to the provision 
of  uniform data.  In its plenary sittings the Advisory Committee will then put forward the 
essential  adjustments  to  be  made  and  will  provide  the  impetus  required  and  where 
necessary  ~ill inform .the comi>etent bodies of its conclusions. 
·part m:  Report  on  equivalence  between  measures  to  protect 
national finances and those to  protect the Community's 
financial interests 
It cannot be  denied  that  this  type  ot demonstration  is  quickly  confronted  with 
important methodological obstacles.  However, to  leave completely aside this aspect of 
the report or to limit matters to the claim that equivalence is obtained by definition, given 
that  Community  monies  are  filtered  through  the  public  purse  and  are  therefore 
transformed into  nati~rtal funds  or even that equivalence has  always  existed and  goes 
even further (Community finances are better protected) since before the entry into force 
of the TEU,  all  of this  stems  from  the  affirmation of principle and comes back to  a 
reasse~sment of the soundness of the initial request of the European Council. 
Compliance with the principle of assimilation has therefore been shown in most 
reports by  re~ating aspects considered previously in the form  of conclusions. 
The absence of comparative. national and  Community :budget fraud results makes 
any comment on the true extent of assimilation into the Union most delicate.  At most 
a set of indicators may be noted.  Analysis of the systems in place (texts, organization) 
gives the appearance that revenue is better protected than expenditure.  In the latter area, 
agricultural  expenditure  seems  to  be  better  organized  than  expenditure  on structural 
activities.  In general, the Member States  state once and for all that assimilation has been 
achieved but the assimilation relationship is  never made  from one area to another nor 
fl-23 through comparative results.  The exact measure of the degree of assimilation through 
comparative results is moreover most often absent. 
A number of considerations modify the contours of the principle of assimilation. 
It is often maintained that Community agricultural legislation on checks is so detailed that 
Community  expenditure  is  better  controlled  than  national  expenditure  (this  view  is 
sometimes exemplified). 
Compliance  with  article  209A  includes  adaptation  of national  actions  to  the 
demands of  the protection of  Community finances and the equivalence relationship, often 
set up  as a theorem of equality by  the Member States,  must in fact  be  brought about 
progressively through concrete measures which have to be assessed on a continuous basis 
to  make  progress  both  in  improving  the  Community's  financial  management and  the 
protection of its .financial interests. 
If national  contributions  do  not  always  lend  themselves  to  a  full  and  detailed 
comparative analysis and have not always allowed all the segments of national action to 
comply with the principle of  assimilation to be confirmed, they nevertheless all bring out 
. avenues to  work on and  ways of making progress.  Often moreover they coincide  or 
merge in more than one report.  Most national reports come to the conclusion of  the need 
to progress in all aspects from prevention to enforcement including co-operation. 
The need to act at  Community level to  amplify  in certain areas the monitoring 
systems on the basis of objective criteria to harmonise checks carried out by the Member 
States is often put forward as a priority. 
Likewise some Member States recommend the systematic and regular assessment 
of  these systems to adapt constantly the level of protection of Community finances so as 
to optimize the national and Community monitoring frameworks taking account of the 
needs perceived at the time and the actual risks.  On this point it is often recommended 
that an audit structure should be set up bringing together all areas of expertise. 
The  wish to simplify texts  is  often  put  forward  as  an  indispensable permanent 
feature in achieving coherent legislation which takes account of cost-benefit factors. 
A·24 Co~peration is  adorned  with  numerous  virtues  and  is  often  presented  as  the 
. essential catalyst for national and Community effectiveness in countering sophisticated 
transnational fraud and organized financial 'crime.  The need to develop its possibilities 
both  in  strengthening  work  on  the  ground  and  in  optimizing  the  exploitation  of 
information  seems  to  be  a  commonly  shared  aim  whether  in  improving  existing 
procedures or in extending the institutional forms of co-operation beyond administrative 
assistance. 
For some the optimum position will only be achieved when'the.Community level 
has specific and obligatory systems of  administrative penalties and adequate measures to 
raise the level of compatibility and equivalence of national legislation in penal matters. 
In any event, as the Community achieves the necessary convergence between its 
Member States' economies to enter into the decisive phase of economic and ·monetary 
Union and integration is further achieved by increasing financial intervention, it would 
seem  surprising  to  make  strong  declarations  of intent  at  the  highest  levels  without 
adopting the necessary measures to translate these declarations into concrete progress in 
/  . 
all the areas of protection of its financial interests. 
An improvement  in the  fight  against  fraud,  in  addition  to  actual  assimilation, 
involves a voluntiui.st policy of  prevention ensuring a more effective and equivalent level 
of control  in  ~11 Member  States  but  also  by  means  of a  stronger  and  homogeneous 
enforcement policy in the Union.  The affirmation of  the monitoring and financial control 
obligation of  the collector or administrator of  Community funds obviously stems from the 
main principles of  management of  public finances .  Amplifying this obligation by setting 
up  specific and obligatory rules and criteria for  each area to improve monitoring and 
ensure an equivalent level of  control throughout the Community remains a necessity for 
prevention.  It is not enough either to bring about a rapprochement of the definitions of 
the fraudulent actions or behaviour which it is intended to combat.  It is also necessary 
to make enforcement action homogeneous to counter the movement of  fraudsters to lower 
risk judicial areas.  The obli8ations  set  by  th.e · Cowt of )us~ce in  1989,  deman~ing 
.  .  . 
"effective; proportionate and dissuasive" penalties,. remain an objective to be reached in 
a homogeneous manner throughout the territory of  the Union to combat the development 
of organized fmancial cross border crime which uses its own risk analysis. 
A-2s The protection of  the assets of  the European taxpayer involves the very credibility 
of both the Union's institutions and the Member States.  The Community is committed 
to improving its financial management and must logically be even more attentive to the 
complete protection of its fmancial  interests against any misappropriation.  This is the 
object of the exercise.  It is on this basis that it will undoubtedly be possible to make 
progress to satisfy the mandate of the Cannes and Essen Councils  . 
• 
•  • 
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4 -Preface-
The rmait 
On 11 July 1994 the Council (Ecofin) asked the Commission to produce a progress report 
on the application of Article 209a of the EC Treaty no later than the end of 1995. 
The firs~ paragraph of that Article reads:  •  Member States shtJll taJce·tM same measures 
.  to counter frautl affecting the .financial interests of  the Community tis they take to counter 
fraud affecting their own financial interests'. This enshrines what has come to be known 
as the  ·principle of assimilation'. 
Article 209a has a second paragraph reading:  ·Without prejudice to other provisions of  . 
this Treaty, Member States shtJll coordinate their action aimed at protecting tMjinancial 
interests of  the Community against fraud.  To this end they shtJll organize,  with tM help 
of  the Commission,  close and regular cooperation between tM COIPipCtent departments of 
their administrations' . 
/ 
Subsequently, the Essen European Council on 9 and  10 December 1994 called on the 
Member States to ·submit reports  on  the  measures they  are implementing  to  combat 
wastefulness and tM misuse of Community  resources',  to be examined by the Council 
(Ecofin) in June 1995 and submitted to the European Council in December 1995. 
The Member States' reports were presented within the time allowed - in May 1995 - for 
presentation to the Council (Ecofin) on 19 June. The Council concluded that subsequent 
action should proceed along  three  lines  - national,  Community  and partnershiP - to 
increase the effectiveness of protection of the Community's fmancial interests. 
The Cannes European Council (26 and 27 June) requested the Commission to study and 
analyse the reports. It took note of the Member States' reports on the measures they are 
implementing to combat wastefulness and the misuse of  Community resources, requested  .  ' 
the  Commission to  'prepare  a comparative  sumnuuy for  tM  European  Council  in 
Madrid'  and  • call[ed] on Member States and all institutions to persevere in the battle 
against fraud and waste'. 
5 The metbod5 used 
This document is  an interim report based on the comparative analysis of the  national 
reports.  It takes  stock  of progress  in  applying  Article  209a  on  protection  of the 
Community's financial  interests and  summarizes the  measures taken by the Member 
States to combat the misuse of Community resources. 
The structure is the logical sequel of the structure of  the Article, which sets an objective 
to be attained and prescribes the means to be deployed. Measures taken to give effect to 
the Article are evidence of  the Member States' determination to combat Community fraud  . 
'  in the ~e  way as purely national fraud  (assimilation); ,and the  very existence of the . · 
single market and  the  transnational  nature and  dimension of financial  crime demand 
counter-measures  transcending  the  national  arena  and  proceeding  from  enhanced 
partnership at Community level (cooperation). 
To ensure that natio~l  reports followed a standard pattern facilitating the comparative 
.  .. 
summary, the Commission, as  requested by the Council (Ecofm) on 16 January 1995, 
devised a general-layout to  be used  in preparing the  national reports.  It was entitled 
'Subjects to be covered in qte reports to  be  presented by the Member States' . It was 
discussed  by  the  Advi~ory,  Committee  for  the  Coordination  of Fraud  Prevention 
(COCOLAF) on 1 Februal')' 1995 and approved by the Council (Ecofm) on 20 February. 
By  and large the Member States have adhered to  the proposed layout.  Even so,  their 
reports are highly dissimilar. Some are only a few pages long; the longest has 78 pages. 
Above all, their content varies widely, as the emphasis is not placed on the same items. 
Some Member States highlight ·recent changes to their anti-fraud laws. Others highlight 
the administrative organization and distribution of functions in verifying the use made of 
funds.  Some were more precise than others as  to  the  results obtained from the action 
taken and the follow-up  to checks undertaken or observations made by  the European 
Court of Auditors. 
The explanation may  lie  partly  in  the  short time  available  to  the  Member States  for 
answering an ambitious survey. Those responsible for compiling the reports may have 
6 found it ~possible to  gath~r all the requisite information and therefore concentrated on 
those items which struck them as  p~rticularly important. The Commission was unable to 
engage in the dialogue with the Member States which would have facilitated the exercise 
and yieldc;d. a balanced set of contributions. 
The Member States give political reasons to explain the absence of  certain aspects.  VAT 
fraud,  for  instance,  was  left  out  of  several  reports.  True,  the  collection  of the 
•  I  .  . 
Community share of the tax is an integral part of the national system, but more details 
of  the problems specific to this sector would have provided a basis for comparing relative 
effectiveness in the  various fields.  This is particularly important in the context of the  .  .  . 
single  market and  rules  of procedure  which  have  enhanced  the independence  of the 
Member States' authorities. 
Lastly, the differences may be explained by differences in the remits given by the Ecofin 
Council on 11 July 1994 and by the Essen European Council. Some reports focus on the 
legal  and  institutional'  approach,  demonstrating  the  application  of the  assimilation 
l?.rinciple  and the  existence of cooperation.  Others  are  embellished by  further,  more 
precise data as  to  the  results achieved  in the  protection of the Community's fmancial 
interests. 
This  report  proceeds  from  the  layout  suggested  to  the  Member  States.  It  contains 
comparative tables setting out the information to hand and revealing, a contrario, those 
areas where it was  not possible  to produce the  summary.  The utility of pursuing and 
amplifying  the  exercise  in conjunction with  the  Member  States  will  then have  to  be 
investigated so that the fullest benefit of the analysis can be enjoyed. 
Tables  are  given at  various  places  in  this  report  to  summarize certain categories  of 
infonmtion taken from the national reports; they are designed to constitute an objective 
basis for the comparative analysis. It is  obviously not possible to tabulate all the details 
supplied by  the  Member States.  The  Commission has  endeavoured  to  reproduce  the 
national  contributions  as  faithfully  as  possible,  but  there  are  inevitably  risks  in  any 
selection process.  Readers seeking access  to exhaustive information on any particular 
point is accordingly referred to the national reports annexed to this summary report. 
7 Each part and  section contains a commentary  illustrating the  points that appear most 
significant.  In addition,  guidelines  or  avenues  to  be  explored  reflecting  the  Ecofin 
Council's conclusions of July  1994 and  June  1995  are offered as a means of laying .a. 
basis for action to  pursue the fight against fraud and wastefulness and to improve the 
effectiveness of the  protection of the  Community's financial interests,  as called for at 
Cannes. 
The first part of this report is on the  application of the assimilation principle enshrined 
in Article 209a of the  EC Treaty. 
The second part takes stock of the cooperation arrangements introduced by the second  . 
paragraph of Article 209a of the  EC Treaty. 
The third part evaluates the degree of equivalence of measures to protect national and 
Community finance. 
8 Part  I:  Application of the first paragraph of Article 209a of the EC. Treaty 
.· (assimilation· principle) 
The first paragraph of Article 209a of the EC Treaty reads:  'Member States shall take  .- . 
the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as 
they  ~ke to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests'. · 
.  ) 
. This writes into the Treaty the rule enunciated by the Court of Justice in ·1989 when it 
. declared in  rel~tion to the. Member States' obligation$ uriaer the first paragraph of ArtiCle  . 
S  of  what was then the EEC Treaty C  Member States shall take alJ appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations arising out of this 
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Communicy·.  They sliall 
~  - ~ .  .  '  . 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks') that they were under an obligation 
'  .  I  '  '  ' 
to. penalize  infringements of Community  law  'under conditions,  both  procedural and  · · 
s~bstantive, wh.ich are  analogo~s to those applicable to infringements of national I<iw of 
a similar  natt~re and  importance and· which,  in  any event,  make  the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive': 
The principles enunciated by  the Court and by the Union Treaty, though not i~entical, · 
pverlap and amplify each other. 
The  assimilation  principle  is  expressed  in  stronger  terms  in  the  Union. Treaty,  for 
.  . 
Art~cl~ 209a  requires  the· Member States to  .. take  the. 'same measures'  and  not  ju~t . 
'analogous'  me~sures. Its  scope  is  broader since  it  concerns  not  only  ~penalties_ for 
infringements but  all  'measures' (principal  and~  subordinate legislation,  administrative 
,·  .  '  ' 
. .  .  . 
·organization and scales of penalties) to combat fraud.against the Community's financial 
interests. 
.  .  .  .  . 
-The Court, <.m  the other hand. unlike the Treaty. sets a definite objective as to  the result  · 
to  be  ;tttaincd. in  terms  of  pcnal_tic,'i  (which  n~i.J~t  he· -effective;  proportionate  and 
dissuasive),  which  is  thus part of theacquis communautaire. 
<) 
I. The Member States' reports suggest that this is how they see their obligations and that 
they apply Article 5 as interpreted by  the  Court of Justice and Article 209a of the EC 
Treaty  in  combination  with  each  other.  Most  of them  accordingly  cover  both  the 
measures they  have taken to  assimilate fraud  against the  Community's and their own 
financial  interests  and  the  effectiveness  of the  penalties  for  which  they  have  made 
provision. 
Following the layout suggested to the Member States, the part of this report devoted to 
progress in the application of the assimilation principle describes national measures to 
combat fraud against the Community budget (section 1.1), evaluates their results (section 
1.2) and  tracks  the  action taken  in  response  to  the  report of the  European Court of 
Auditors (section 1.3). 
1.1.  National  measures  in  the  assimilation  context  (normative  provisions, 
organization of services) 
There  are  two  types  of measure  - legislation  (1.1.1)  and  departmental  organization 
measures (1.1.2). 
Point 1.1.1 ought to have made it possible to offer a panorama of national instruments 
to combat fraud against the Community budget from two angles - prevention (provisions 
for checks) and enforcement (provisions for penalties). Point 1.1. 2 highlights the various 
organizational approaches, distinguishing departments responsible for traditional checks 
and those responsible specifically for countering fraud which operate according to their 
own logic given their own mission. 
1.1.1.  Summary description and evolution of the legislation 
The layout suggested to the Member States called for a brief description (with historical 
background)  of (a)  legislation,  (b)  subordinate  instruments  and  (c)  administrative 
instructions,  circulars,  etc.  One  Member  State  saw  no  need  to  describe  the  various 
instruments on the grounds that Article 209a is directly applicable and specific legislation 
is nugatory and that Community funds transit via the national treasury and are treated in 
the same way as  national funds. 
10 This is  an isolated case.  The  other  reports cite or reproduce the  main provisions of 
principal and other legislation. 
It has been found that preventive measures received little attention in the national reports. 
In some cases they are considered in the sections relating to the organization of checks; 
in others th~y are in the section on the law, with enumerations of instruments presented 
without further comment. In most cases, however, they are simply ignored, as the reports 
on point  1.1.1  tend  to  focus  on the  enforcement angle.  Preventive  measures  might  .. 
therefore deserve  studying  in  greater depth at a subsequent stage of the comparative 
survey. 
The reports reveal that most Member States treat revenue and expenditure thiough quite 
separate sets of rules. This was the approach taken 'Yhen the convention on the protection 
of the Community's financial interests was approved at Cannes; it does not preclude an 
all-inclusive approach to  the  fight  against organized financial crime but distinguishes 
fraud on the expenditure side and  on the  revenue side in the  definitions of fraudulent 
conduct. 
. 
The rules governing resources are usually to be found  in specific instruments of tax or 
customs  law  (a).  The  rules  governing  fraud  on  the  revenue  side  only  rarely  make 
distinctions between different revenue categories (b). But there is a discernible trend in  . 
the  Member States for  legislation to  contain specific provisions expressly countering 
fraud against the Community's financial  interests (c). 
(a)  The resources side 
Proflsions to counter fraud against. Community revenue 
Mem  General criminal  Specific criminal  Administrative  Historical 
ber  offences  offences  penalties  background 
State 
B  Forgery, uttering  Customs and  Excise  No provisions in the  Far-reachins reform 
forged documents,  (General) Act  CuStoms and· Excise  of the Act by the 
fraudulent  (sections  114,  115,  (General) Act for  Act of 27.12.1993 
conversion,  157,  202, 237, 238,  administrative  with regard to the 
receiving,  220, 233, 234,  penalties  amount and 
laundering  2S6):  fines  and  enforcement of 
custodial sentences  fmes,· to boost their 
deterrent effect 
11 OK  Fraud, forgery,  Aggravated  Fines set below the  None 
uttering forged  smuggling offences  level required to 
documents, etc.  (Cr~. Code  trigger criminal 
•  section 289).  prosecution 
Penalties 
determined by 
Chapter  11  of the 
General Customs 
Code and the 
Community Imports 
and Exports Act 
D  Forgery and false  Tax criminal law  Administrative  None 
accounting  (tax fraud);  penalties provided 
(obtaining by  . 
offences formally  for each type of 
deception only on  extend to  Community revenue 
the expenditure side}  Community revenue  (agricultural levies 
by reference to 
customs and tax 
legislation} 
EL  The information in 
the reports does not 
provide a basis for 
comparative analysis 
E  Crim. Code section  Institutional Act on  Administrative  Reforms IIU10UDCed 
349 protects public  smuggling;  no  penalties provided  to make 
revenue; althougll  explicit assimilation  for  by Tax (General}  assimilation explicit 
the assimilation is  Act and Tax 
not explicit,  Budgets (General) 
Community revenue  Act 
is included.  Also 
sections 403, S28 
(obtaining by 
deception) and 302 
(forgery} 
F  Offences under the  Customs criminal 
general criminal law  legislation 
apply to Community 
revenue 
IRL  Report contains  Legislation defming  What can be  None 
insufficient  customs fraud  considered 
information  offences applies to  administrative 
agricultural levies,  penalties are 
excise duties and  provided for by 
VAT  specific legislation 
I  No information on  Criminal offences  Administrative  None 
the applicability of  defmed by customs  penalties provided 
provisions defming  legislation (customs  for by customs 
general offences to  duties and  legislation 
the revenue side  agricultural levies} 
L  Forgery, uttering  Customs legislation  Administrative 
forged documents  penalties provided 
and false accounting  for  by specific 
legislation 
12 NL  False accounting  Customs and Excise  In the Import and  Community 
(Crim. Code section  . (General) Act,  Export Act and the  Customs Code 
225), relevant to all  section 171  and  Agricultural Produce  (1.1.1994) 
f~rms of EC fraud,  provisions on  Act  amplified by 
~  orpnized crime  smugling  national leaislation 
. (Crim. Code  ~tion  ·  (sections  169 and 
140)  170); Import and 
Expon Act section 
18;  Agricultural 
Produce Act 
section 12 
Os  Information on 
I 
Tax leaislation  Tax criminal law 
applicability of  applies to the three  amended following 
criminal law not in  revenue areas  accession 
report  (customs duties, 
.  agricultural levies, 
VAn 
p  .Forgery. obtaining  Decree-Act 376/89,  Provided for in  Apparently none 
by deception,  section 21  (import  Customs Code 
fraudulent  and export 
convenion,  smugaling). 
corruption  Apparently no 
s~ific legislation 
for agricultural 
levies.  VAT 
legislation not 
supplied 
su  Customs Act and  No indication of  Legislation in own 
Excise Act contain  nature of penalties  resources mauen 
provisions for  amended following 
'  criminal penalties  acceuion 
sv  Fraud provislona. of  Smugling Act  LeJialation relating 
Crim. Code  to customs and 
VAT ameaded 
foUowin& accession 
UK.  Customs and Excise  Administrative  VAT legislation 
Management Act  penalties provided  reformed in 1994; 
1979 determines  • for by specific  ·  no details given 
offences and  legislation 
penalties; Common 
Agricultural Policy 
Act  1991  with less 
severe penalties; 
0  VAT Act  1994 
On the resource side,  the  problem of the  assimilation principle is  not appreciated as 
regards revenue categories taken individually but in terms of the legal frameworks for 
the different resources. 
13 For the traditional Community own resources - customs duties and agricultural levies -
there is  no longer a  national set of rules  to  which the  Community scheme could be 
assimilated.  For VAT,  as  was  stated  at  the  beginning  of this  report,  there  is  .~11 
assimilation in the way the national and Community shares are established and collected. 
Some information is given on developments since the Yugoslav Maize case  and the entry 
into force of the Union Treaty. 
The Belgian Act of 27 December 1993 amending the Customs and Excise (General) Act 
toughened the criminal law components of customs law in a number of respects, and 
particularly by raising the  amounts of fines,  hitherto not sufficiently deterrent, quite 
substantially. 
The Luxembourg report does not state whether the tougher provisions enacted in Belgium 
. '  . 
were  taken over in Luxembourg  in  the  context of customs  union between- the  two 
countries. Nor does it confirm whether Luxembourg, where there are ·no provisions for 
criminal offences in the VAT legislation, is  planning to remedy the deficiency. 
The  Member  States  that  acceded  to  the  Union  in  1995  have  adjusted  their  legal 
instruments to the  assimilation principle.  These Member States do not on the whole 
highlight changes in their criminal law for the purposes of Article 209a, but it would be 
worth studying the more recent provisions (notably criminal law provisions in Finland), 
and the national reports do point to explicit assimilation in some areas. 
Austria, for instance, has changed its criminal tax legislation to treat fraud in respect of 
Corrununity  levies  and  ~xes in  the  same  way  as  fraud  in  respect  of 'the  national 
equivalents. Customs legislation has been extended to cover offences committed outside 
Austria btit within the  Community's customs  territory.  The Finnish report mentions 
amendments  to  customs  law  (definition  of customs  offences  and  related  penalties) 
alongside the description of its agricultural and VAT legislation. 
The question of assimilation on the  revenue  side  (in the enforcement context) must 
therefore be seen in the broad sense as a comparison between the legal framework for 
purely  Community  resources  (the  traditional  own  resources)  and  for  the  national 
14 resources  that  provide  the· bulk  of the  revenue  in  the  national  bud•ets.  Another 
wortbwbile comparison woUld be between natio!IJ!ll schemes inter-It, to conftrtn (or not) 
the existence of  distortions, notably in relition to administrative and crim~l  penalties, 
that might be such as to facilitate fraudulent transactions between Member, States or to  . 
deflect trade within the internal market, or even to prompt firms to relocate towants the 
places where the enforcement risk is felt to be lighter. 
(b)  ·  The expenditure side 
Provisions to counter fraud ap1nst Cammunlty expeDdltare 
Mem  General crimiDal  Specific criminal  Administrative  Hiltoric:al 
ber  offences  offences  ~ties  blckJI'OUIICI 
State 
B  Foraery. uttering  Fraud in relation to  Definitive or  Act of7.6.1994-
forpd documents,  .. grants (Act of  temporary  specific offeace of.  . 
fraudulent  7:6: 1994~, same  diaqualiftcation from  fraud iD relation to 
con.vetsion,  penalties as for.  Agricultural FuDd  annts llld much 
.  obtainiq by  obtaining by  gnpts; coafiacation  heavier penalties 
decepti011,  receiving,  deception;  Act of  of benefits received 
lauaderill&,  28.3.1975 on trade 
· misappropriation of  in agricultural, 




DK  Obtaining by  No specific offence  Interest on late  Apri11994: 
deception·, forgery,  except in  payment; flat-rate  proviliODI for flat-
uttering foraed  agriculture  surcharges  rate lurcharpl 
docuDJentl,  false  (EAGGF Guidance  made iD 1eplation 
statements to public  and Guarantee)  relatina to EAOOF 
authorities  (fines and custodial  (Guarantee) 
sentenCes) 
D  Obtaining by  Offence of fraud in  Adminiltrative  None 
deception  relation to grants  penalti~ pro~ 
extends explicitly to  for uplicitly·by the  . 
· Cotnmunity funds  leplatiOD relatiDa 
to qricultural_ 
Diarbis 
...  . . 
15 EL  Obtaining by  Heavier fines  for  'Administrative  Assimilation 
deception,  forgery,  offences to the  penalties provided  principle in section 
uttering forged  detriment of the  for different  36 of Act 2172/93 
documents,  public authorities,  EAGGF secton 
fraudulent  the European  (olive oil, fruit and 
bankruptcy,  Community being  veg. ,sheepmeat, 
receiving etc. Act  explicitly included  goatmeat, tobacco, 
2172193  imposes  cotton).  No 
penalties for fraud  information on the 
against the  Structural Funds 
Community's 
fmancial  interests 
E  Offences against the  No.  Plans  to  Administrative  Budget (General) 
Crim.Code  introduce blanket  penalties provided  Act extended to 
(obtaining by  assimilation by  for  EAGGF  Community funds 
deception,  forgery,  specific offence of  Guarantee,  in 1991; 
misappropriation of  fraud against the  Structural Funds and  administrative 
.. 
public funds)  and  Community's  Cohesion Fund in  penalties introduced 
fraud in relation to  fmancial  interests  Budget (General) 
grants (section 3SO  Act section 82;  fines 
Crim. Code)  :  and disqualification 
from benefits 
F  Obtaipingby  Specific criminal 
deception,  provisions for 
fraudulent  EAGGF Guarantee 
conversion, forgery,  and SIGC 
uttering forged 
documents·  • 
•. 
IRL  General criminal  No.  A Bill to create  National  None 
law (Larceny Act  a general offence of  administrative fmes 
1916; Forgery Act  .  frauct against the .  r- in EAGGF matters 
1913; Falsificatioa  Community's 
of Accounts Act  fmancial  interests is 
1875; Conspiracy to  :  in preparation 
Defraud, Bribing & 
Corruption -
Criminal Justice Act 
1951 
I  No information on  Crim. Code section  Administrative  Act  No 142 of 
applicability of  640 (aggravated  penalties provided  19.2.1992, 
general criminal  deception to obtain  for  in relation to  replacing Act No 
offences to fraud  public grants) and  EAGGF Guarantee  898 of 23.12.1986, 
against the  section 316bis  inter alia  explicitly 
Community  (misappropriation  assimilates 
of State funds) 
L  Forgery, uttering  Crim. Code section  For EAGGF  1993 Act extends 
forged documents,  496-1  (obtaining by  Guarantee and the  Crim. Code section 
misappropriation,  deception) explicitly  Structural Funds  496 to Community 
fraudulent  protects Community  fraud 
conversion,  expenditure 
receiving 
16 NL  False accounting,  No specific offence  CAP - penalties  None 
forgery - Crim.  in relation to  provided for  by 
Code sections  140  Community  speci(te legislation; 
and 21S  expenditure  none for Structural 
Punds 
-
p  Forgery, obtaining  Decree-Act 28/84  For the  ESF  None 
by deception,  of 20.1.1984 
fraudulent  sections 36 to 38 -
conversion,  specific offences of 
corruption  fraud  in relation to 
grants 
Os  Crim. Code  Criminal offences  Criminal tax law 
(unspecified)  defined in  amended following 
agricultural markets  accession 
legislation; tax 
evasion provisions 
apply to fraud in 
relation to export 
refunds 





sv  Crim.Code  Criminal penalties  Disqualification by  Legislation on 
provisions on fraud  (up to 6 months'  way of national  agriculture and 
imprisonment) for  penalty;  may be  structural assistance 
infringements of  ordered by  amended following 
Community  agricultural control  accession 
agriculture  authorities 
legislation 
UK  Common-law  None  Administrative  None 
offences of  penalties provided 
conspiracy to  for  in Agriculture 
defraud; Theft Acts  Act  1957 
contain provisions 
on fraud 
The layout proposed by the Commission, which called for a description in each area, was 
not generally followed. A trend for each area of expenditure is given for Austria, where 
fraud in relation to export refunds has been assimilated to tax evasion by amendments to 
the agricultural markets legislation. 
Where the reports do mention changes in the  law,  they most commonly announce the 
creation  of new  specific  offences  of fraud  in  relation  to  grants,  with  Community 
expenditure being included. 
17 Section 264 of the German Criminal Code,  introduced in  1976, creates an offence of 
deliberate or negligent fraud  in relation to grants;  by  subsection 264(6) this  includes 
payments made under Community schemes. 
.  '  . 
Tbe Member States often make penalties subject to the existence of relevant Community  . 
ndes imposina specific obligations. The German report raises this question and cites its 
.  9rants Act, which provides that penalty provisions relating to Community grants depend 
on the existence and substance of relevant Community instruments.· The Council adopted 
its common position on the Commission proposal  for  a Regulation on administrative 
penalties on 29 June  199S, after the national reports had been produced, to meet their 
concerns in this respect. 
Since the Union Treaty came into force,  Belgium and Luxembourg have changed their 
legislation to assimilate the rules governing expenditure in a comprehensive fashion.  In 
Belgium, the Act of 7 June  1994 extended the scope of the Royal Decree of 1933 that 
was confined to grants from the Belgian State itself. Henceforth, the offence of fraud in 
relation to grants extends to grants from  internatiol}ll institutions. Penalties have been 
made heavier and adjusted to  the  offence, reference being made  in Parliament to the  .  . 
Court of Justice's  decisions.  In  Luxembourg,  legislation  enacted  on  1S  July  1993 
extended the defmitioJ;t of obtaining by deception (Criminal Code section 496) to cover 
fraud  in relation  to  grants  from  all  sources,  including  grants  from  international 
institutions. 
In the item on historical background, the money-laundering legislation, which provides 
a means  of tracing  money  obtained fraudulently  from  the  Community  budget,  was 
mentioned .by  some  Member  Sta~s (Belgil,lnt  - Act of 17.7.1990;  Ireland - Criminal 
· Justice .Act 1994; Italy - Criininal Code section 64.8). 
Progress in in~cing  the .assimilation principle -on the expenditure side has also to be 
cons~red  in relation to the effectiveness of measures taken on the revenue side.  The 
existence  of areas of di~tortion in the  efficacy  of both prevention  and  enforcement 
•  '  I ' 
(administrative aod criminal penalties) should· be highlighted so that standards can be 
raised where they are visibly lowest. The position is the same as on the revenue side: in 
·18 addition to general assimilation, there is the objective of raising standards of protection 
' 
throughout the Community. 
(c)  General criminal law 
Several Member States state that their general criminal law is adequate to give effect to 
the assimilation principle in legal terms. 
The national Criminal Codes or equivalent bodies of legislation all make provision for 
offences  that can embrace both the  Community's and the  Member States'  fmancial 
interests - obtaining by deception, forgery and uttering forged documents arid fraudulent 
conversion are the most important. Some Member States (the Netherlands, for example) 
list dozens of provisions to be found in a great number of separate enactments that can 
be used against fraudsters, depending on the form the frau61  takes. 
Most Member States believe that the ordinary criminal offences m adequately defined 
to protect the Community's financial interests. Assimilation for enforcement purposes is 
implied in provisions creating offences and penalties that are applicable in like manner 
to Community and national interests. 
Even so,  it is  clear from  some of the  reports that the trend is towards making fraud 
against the Community's financial  interests an offence in its own right. The trend has  . 
gathered momentum with the Convention on the protection of the Community's fmancial 
interests on which an agreement was reached at Cannes and which was signed on 26 July 
1995. Article 1  (2) requires Member States to take the necessary and appropriate measures 
to  transpose  into  their  criminal  law  the  provisions  of Article  1(1)  (defining  what 
constitutes fraud against the Community's financial interests) so as to make the conduct 
described therein a  criminal offence.  The purpose,  as  is  clear from  the explanatory 
report, is that Member States should make fraud either a specific or an express offence 
or at least bring it within the general definition of the offence of fraud. 
There is reportedly a general blanket offence of  fraud in Greece, whose report states that 
Act No 2172/93 (section 36) extends the scope of criminal penalties to cover fraud to the 
detriment of  the Community. Other Member States have announced their plans to provide 
19 for a general offence in their legislation shortly. Spain announces a Bill to amend the 
Criminal  Code  by' providing  expressly  for  fraud  against  the  Community.  Ireland's 
introductory report, after stating the traditional p<)sition that there is no single offence of 
fraud but a multitude of forms of fraudulent conduct, likewise announces that a Bill is 
in preparation to consolidate the existing provisions in respect of  dishonesty and define 
new offences, including an offence of fraud against the Community's interests. 
Lastly, mention must be made of Italy,  where fraud offences are defined by a series of 
enactments, mostly predating the Union Treaty, relating to different areas of  Community 
finance.  The  Customs  (Consolidation)  Act  (sections  34  and  282)  establish  specific 
offences of fraud in relation to  ·import and export duties, levies and other charges on 
imports and exports provided for by Community instruments' . On the expenditure side, 
sections 640bis and 316bis of the Criminal Code prohibit and penalize the unwarranted 
obtaining of grants from public fund&  and their misappropriation to wrongful purposes 
and have been made applicable to  Community funds.  Act No 55/90 already specified 
grants  from  the  European  Communities  among  the  areas  to  which  section  640bis 
(aggravated cases of  obtaining public funds by deception). As regards section 316bis, Act 
No 181/92 puts national and Community funds on the same footmg. The Italian report 
adds that administrative penalties may be imposed in addition to criminal penalties and 
that the Commission has been accorded a stronger status in criminal proceeding$. 
The  two  tables  summarizing  the  position  on  this  point  regarding  the  revenue  and 
expenditure sides show that only part of the requisite information is  to hand and that 
further research will be needed to consolidate the basis for pursuing the intensive fight 
against fraud and wastefulness called for by  the Cannes European Council. 
Consolidating the information base  is  vital for a full  picture of the political climate in 
which further progress is  to  be made  towards attaining the objective set at Cannes of 
vigorously  combating  fraud  and  raising  the  level  of protection of the  Community's 
fmancial interests. 
Most Member States  have  preferred  the  differentiated  approach  to  the  revenue  and 
expenditure sides. This approach has been confirmed at Community level by the twofold 
definition of fraud  in Article  1 of the  Convention on protection of the Community's 
20 ~ial  interests  approved  at Cannes  aDd signed on 26 July  1995.  It is  the loaical 
consequence of the  differ.ing defmitions  and. scope· of obligations ·in Community  and 
national law. AI the Spanish report stresses, the Member States are respousible for the 
bulk of  the procedural rules in the law govemina own resources in aeneraiiDd 'VAT in 
particular (rights and obliaations of administrations  aud taxpayers,  establishment and 
recovery  procedures,  limitation  periods  and  conditions,  powers  and  obligations. of 
inspection  o~cers, penalties,  etc.).  By  contrut,  the  bulk  of the  111lei  gov~  · 
'  ' 
agricultural.expeDditure, representing balf the budget, are enacted by .the Community and 
must be applied direc:dy by the Member States. 
This situation of fact raises questions as to the degree  ~f  assimilation of rules governing 
expenditure and revenue and their respective degrees of efficacy.  The analysis should 
be continued in this direction. 
Beyond the further analysis to be based on amplification of the answers supplied by the 
national  reports,  four  major  guidelines  ~y  help  to briD&  the  objective  set by  the 
European Couneil within reach. 
/ 
Avenues to be explored (point 1.1.1) 
What  is  clear  from  this  initial  stage  of  the  comparative  analysis  is  that  most 
Member States have preferred the differentiated approach to the revenue and expeDditure 
<  ,. 
sides.  Thia aituation of fact raises questiona u  to the  degree of ushnilation of rules 
governing expenditure and revenue and their respective degrees of  efficacy.  Finally, the 
question arises as to how to achieve this objective in response to the mandate from the 
European Council. 
A.  There is  good reason for  wondering  whether  this  difference  in the degree of 
harmonization is truly warranted when a coherent horizontal approach to protection of 
the Community's fmaneial interests is required, given that it doel not adequately reflect 
the aeneral similarity of  tbe conduct and techniques of  oraanized financial crime against 
the Community budget on both tbe revenue and the expenditure sides.  Without doubt 
this consideration applies also to prevention which is an area which still requirel analysis. 
There there  is  a convergeoce with tbe regular evaluation of national conuol systems 
suggested in some reports. 
21 B.  Regarding administrative penalties, the reports. suggest that national provisions are 
more aophilticated on the revenue side than on the expenditure side. The information 
supplied in them does not indicate that there are national administrative penalties, either 
autoDOIDOUI of or additional to thole provided for by the Community in aariculture. A 
clear policy of tougher administrative penalties on the expenditure aide  is an obvious 
nec:essity. The common position adopted by the Council on 29June 199S on the proposal 
for  a Regulation  setting a lepl buia for  Community administrative. penalties  could 
provide  a 111eful  reference  framework  for  this  purpose,  panicularlr  as  regards  the 
eatabliahment of penalties in the various expenditure areas. The memorandum produced . 
by the French Presidency and Spain's scheme of administrative penalties for offences  . 
relatinl  tO  national. and  Community public  funds  (Budget  Act  1991)  are also  useful 
dilcuaion material. , 
C;  The  transpoaal··of the  Convention on protection of the  Community's financial 
intcreats in the M~ber  States will provide the legal bUis the Member States need for 
creating at least a ipeCific offence of fraud.  Rapid attainment of this objective wopld 
generate a practi~~ possibility of prosecuting individuals committing the acts specified 
by the Convention and of organizing judicial cooperation to that end.  Proareas here 
would lay ~  effective buis ·for the  Communi~  m.titutiona and the Member States to 
mobilize all thC ~s.  neected for unifolm. enforcement .throughout the Community. 
The subjects to be gone intO, apart from judicial cooperation (to be considered in  Part ll) 
include ·the  liability  of individuals. and bodies  corporate,  raised by  the Belpn and 
Spanish reports. There must be a possibility for prosecuting directors and managers of 
companies  and  firms  even  where  it  is .  the  company  or  finn  that  is  theoretically 
responsible for the conduct constituting the offence.  ADd where it is the company that 
enjoys the benefit of Community funds,  it makes sense for  the company  to incur the 
penalties in the event of fraud. 
D.  In addition to  the  question of the  defmition  of the  offence  itself,  the further 
question  is  raised  by  the  Belgian  and  Ital~ reports  of harmonizinl  the  levels  of 
penalties. Excessive variations produce areas of tougher and lighter enforcement and 
22 deflect business flows towards the "softer" Member States. Penalties should therefore be 
more homQgeneous if a satisfactory assimilation and decent degree of protection are to 
be guaranteed throughout the  Union. 
*  * 
* 
1.1.2.  Brief description (with background) of departmental organization 
The departments whose organization is described below are responsible for applying the 
rules outlined above and for the proper management of Community funds. 
The Commission suggested a layout whereby answers would be grouped together on a 
sectoral basis.  The various control structures mentioned (traditional structures, specific 
investigation structures, and horizontal or multidisciplinary structures) are analysed in 
'each case. 
The description of  departments occupies a large part of  the Member States' reports.  The 
complexity of the organizations responsible for  Community funds  is  such that even a 
brief description will usually run to  ten or more pages.  For this  reason a schematic 
presentation has been adopted, each section consisting of summary tables followed by 
comments. 
This report describes the  control  structures for  each sector,  treating  in tum (a)  own 
resources, (b) agricultural expenditure, (c) the Structural Funds and (d) the departments 
which assist the Commission with the direct execution of expenditure. 
(a)  Own resources 
The following table shows the national bodies responsible for controls on own resources. 
The first column shows the  (frequently separate) administrative bodies responsible for 
basic checks on traditional own resources and VAT.  The second column lists the fraud 
23 prevention bodies and the third column the multidisciplinary bodies which may intervene 
in this area. 
Bodies responsible ror own re$0Urc:es 
Traditional control structures (for  Specific investigation structures  Horizontal and 
traditional own resources (TOR) and  (customs and/or taxation)  multidisciplinary structures 
the  VAT resource) 
B  TOR:  Customs and Excise  - -
Administration 
VAT:  not specified 
DK  TOR:  Customs and Tax  - -
Administration 
VAT:  idem 
D  TOR:  OFD (Regional Finance  Zollkriminalamt  Court of Auditors 
Directorate) - Customs and Excise 
Directorate 
VAT:  special departments of the 
OFDs 
EL  TOR:  Customs Directorates of the  Special unit for the  Directorate for the 
Ministry of Financial Affairs  cooordination of enquiries  Prevention of Economic 
VAT:  VAT Directorates  (Ministry of Financial Affairs)  Crime (Ministry of 
Financial Affain) 
E  TOR:  Government Tax  Office - General Audit Office (for  Inspectorate-General (of 
Custoi:ns and Excise Department  government bodies)  goverDment bodiea) - Court 
VAT:  not specified  •  of Auditors 
F  TOR:  DGDDI (Directorate-General  - IGF (laapectorate-Oencral 
for Customs and Indirect Taxes)  of FiDIDces), an 
VAT:  not specified  i.ntel'JiliDWerial body 
IRL  TOR:  Customs departments of the  Investigation Bureau  -
tax authorities  , 
VAT:  not specified 
I  TOR:  Customs administration  - Guardia di Finanza 
VAT:  financial departments 
L  TOR:  Customs and Excise  - -
Administration 
VAT:  not specified 
NL  TOR:  Directorate-General for  FIOD (Fiscale InlichliJllen en  BCD (Economische 
Customs  opsporingsdienst)  Centrale Dielllt) 
VAT:  Tax authorities and FIOD 
P'  TOR:  DGA (Directorate-General  Fraud Prevention Division  Inspectorate-General of 
for Customs)  (Customs Directorates)  FiDances 
VAT;  not speicifed 
Os  TOR:  Customs Administration 
I  - Coun of Auditors 
VAT:  not specified 
24 su  TOR:  Directorate-General for  Steering Committee of the  Steering Committee of the 
Customs  Customs and Tax Authorities  •Project East• Working 
VAT:  Directorate-General for  Group 
Taxation 
SV  TOR:  Directorate-General for  - -
Customs 
VAT:  National Tax Office  . 
UK  TOR:  HM Customs and Excise,  Investigation Division  Serious Fraud Office 
which is  responsible for both 
customs duties and VAT 
• 
In two Member States, the United Kingdom and Denmark, traditional own resources and 
VAT are handled by the same departments.  In Ireland the customs are part of the tax 
authotity. 
The  other  national  reports  either  disregard  VAT .  for  the  reasons  already  stated 
("assimilation" is achieved in practice if a tax is paid both to the Member State and to 
the Community) or indicate that the control of traditional own resources is distinct from 
the controls on VAT.  This does -ftot  in itself call for any observations but reference 
should be made to part 1.2 for the results obtained by such controls. 
Alongside the traditional controls applied by the administrative bodies listed in the first 
column, most Member States claim to have control and investigation structures for the 
monitoring of Copununity resources. 
Some of these are specific structures (listed in the second column), with responsibility 
\ 
for  all  own  resources.  Some  are  mainly  concerned  with  investigations  and  fraud 
prevention, e.g. the FIOD (Fiscale Inlichtingen en Opsporingsdienst) in the Netherlands, 
the Zollkriminalamt in Germany or the Investigation Divisions in the United Kingdom 
and Irelarid.  Other bodid are concerned with ensuring a consistent level of protection 
for  Community  resources,  e.g.  the  General  Audit  Office  of the  Spanish  central 
government, the Steering Committee of the customs and tax authorities in Finland or the 
Special Unit for the Coordination of Controls in Greece.  • 
Lastly,  several  Member States  mention.  the  existence  of multidisciplinary  bodies 
responsible for controls on all public funds,  including the  Comm~nity's own, resources. 
Such bodies include the Inspectorate-General of  Finance (France, Portugal) and the Court 
25 of Auditors (Germany, Spain).  Some multidisciplinary bodies enjoy wide powers, such 
as Italy's Guardia di Finanza, the Belgian OCDEFO and the Serious Fraud Office in the 
United Kingdom.  Where revenue is concerned, these bodies also have powers to carry 
out general inspections or to initiate special large-scale investigations. 
Notice is given of  similar developments in the reports from Belgium, where the Customs 
and  Excise  Administration  is  to  be  restructured,  and  from  the  Netherlands,  where 
coordination and consultative bodies are to  be set up to combat Community fraud. 
The  above  table  shows  that,  in  terms  of  organization,  the  Member States  have 
considerable means at their disposal for the protection of Community own resources and 
that, to a great extent, this protection is  equivalent to that given to their own national 
revenue. 
(b)  EAGGF Guarantee Section 
The information provided .in the national reports has been condensed into the following 
table, which distinguishes between traditional control structures, specific investigation 
structures and multidisciplinary  structures.  As  a rule  the  Member States distinguish 
between intervention measures,  direct aids  and  trade-related measures.  To simplify 
presentation, however, the  latter (which give rise to export refunds subject to separate 
customs controls) have been omitted. 
Organization of EAGGF Guarantee controls 
Member State  Separation of  Independence and  Specific investigation  Horizontal and 
payment/inspection  powers of officials  structures  multidisciplinary 
(traditional controls)  responsible  for  structures 
traditional controls 
B  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  yes  Intervention:  IMP  IGE (Economic 
Direct aids:  yes  (economic affairs and  (Raw Materials  Inspectorate-General) 
health),  seem to have  Inspectorate) 
extensive powers  Direct aids:  -
DK  Intervention:  no  - - -
Direct aids:  -
26 I,· 
D  Intervention:  - Intervention:  yes  -
Direct aids:  - (BALM) 
Direct aids:  yes 
(Under) 
EL  - Intervention:  yes  - Special body for the 
(Nomos)  coordination of 
Direct aids:  yes  . 
controls 
(Nomos) 
E  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  yes  - IGAE 
Direct aids:  no  (agencies)  (Inspectorate-General 
Direct aids:  yes  · of the Central 
(Regional authorities)  .•  Government) 
lnspectorates-General 
of the Autonomous 
Communities 
F 
l  Intervention:  no  - Inspectors employed  Inspectorate;.(ieneral 
Direct aids:  yes  by ACOFA (Agence  of Finances; 
centrale des  Inspectorate-General 
organismes  for Agriculture 
d' intervention dans le 
secteur agricole) 
IRL  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  yes  Intervention:  yes (in  -
Direct aids:  no  (Min.  of Ag.)  certain sectors) 
'  Direct aids:  Direct aids:  ..  yes  -
(Min.  of Ag.) 
I  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  no  - Guardia di Finanza 
Direct aids:  yes  Direct aids:  yes 
(Min.  of Ag.)  . 
L  - - - -
N  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  powers  CCG {Control  PBO (Special 
Direct aids:  no  dele,sated to sectoral  Coordination Group)  investigation service) 
bodies  AID  . 
Direct aids:  yes  (Inspectorate-General 
(Min.  of Ag.)  for Agriculture) 
Trade:  yes 
(customs) 
p  mtervention:  no  Intervention:  yes  Intervention:  - Inspectorate-General 
Direct aids:  no  (agency)  Direct aids:  yes  of Finances 
Direct aids:  yes 
~  (Min. of Ag.) 
Os  - - - -
su  - - - -
sv  - - - -
UK  Intervention:  no  Intervention:  powers  AFU (the Agency's  SFO (Serious  F~aud 
Direct aids:  no  delegated to sectoral  Anti-fraud Unit)  Office) 
bodies 
Direct aids:  yes 
· (Min.  of Ag.) 
Trade:  yes  . 
(customs) 
27 
,, Most of the  national  reports  discuss  trade-related  measures,  which essentially  mean 
export refunds .ift  the  EAGGF Guarantee  context.  For such expenditure the  control 
bodies  in  each  Member State  are  independent  of those  responsible  for  examining 
applications and making payments.  They form part of the customs authorities and apply 
centralized controls, operating quite separately from the payment agencies and employing 
officials who generally enjoy extensive powers. 
On the other hand, much less information is available on intervention measures 9r direct 
aids. 
Where direct aids are concerned,' the  reports from  Germany, Spain, Italy and Austria 
indicate  that primary  controls  are  decentralized  in  these  countries.  Details  are not 
provided on how the local administrative units responsible for such aid are supervised, 
except for references to bodies with very wide powers.  In all Member States, however, 
centralized controls are applied to intervention and trade. 
Physical controls are carried out in all Member States in accordance with the Community 
rules.  The quantitative targets are criticized in some reports, which place the emphasis 
on risk analysis and targeted controls rather than random checks (Netherlands report) or 
intelligence gathering (Italian report). 
Apart from the customs' role in checking export refunds, controls are usually carried out 
by the payment agency.  In a typical situation the controls will be applied by a division 
or directorate responsible for  internal audits  or for checks within the agency making 
EAGGF Guarantee payments.  Examples of this are provided by Ireland, where an audit 
department of the administrative unit concerned carries out the controls required under 
the Community rules, by Spain, where this task is performed by a control subdirectorate 
of the payment agencies such as SENPA, and by the United Kingdom, where an Internal 
Audit Unit has been set up within the payment agency, alongside the sectoral controls 
carried out by Heads of Policy Division. 
Recent developments  in the  Member States follow  this  typical  pattern.  In Greece a 
Presidential Decree (No 385/1994) altered the organizationofthe Ministry of  Agriculture 
28 by  making  the  Directorate  monitoring  EAGGF  Guarantee  expenditure  part  of the 
Secretariat-General for Agricultural Policy and International Relations;  at the same time, 
an  interna~  audit  division,  responsible  for  sample  checks,  was  set  up  within  the 
Directorateo-(}eneral for the .Management of Agricultural Markets.  Control programmes 
h~ve  been introduced for va~ious sectors (olive oil, fruit and vegetables, tobacco, cotton). 
Similarly,  in  Portugal  the  special  fraud-prevention  services  were  made  part  of the 
Customs Administration and the  National Agricultural Intervention Guarantee Institute 
in 1993.  Luxembourg, for  its'part, states that a start has been made on establishing a 
system of controls, which should be completed by the end of 1995. 
·The  French report provides  use~~ information on staff numbers.  For example,  the 
physical and administrative controls  carried out  by  the  agricultural payment agencies 
require the equivalent of  200 full-time staff to deal with expenditure on price support and 
34 full-time staff to handle direct aids to  farmers.  Undertakings which have received 
funds  from  one  of the  payment  agencies  (there  are  ten  government  agencies,  each 
specializing in a different production sector) are subject to checks by  a central agency 
(ACOFA) which employs about thirty  investigators.  A comparative analysis of these 
structures  could  usefully  be  supplemented  by  similar  data  on  the  numbers  of staff 
available to the inspectorates and  the  powers delegated to them. 
~orne Member States  have  control  structures  which  are  independent  of the  payment 
agencies.  This is the case in Belgium, where the IGE (Economic Inspectorate-General) 
monitors farms  and intervention measures,  working  independently of the  inspectorate 
employed by the BIRB (the Belgian payment agency).  In Italy secondary controls are 
carried out by experts from  the  Guardia  di  Finanza,  who  do  not however enjoy  the 
wide-ranging  investigative  powers  of the  tax  police.  In the  Netherlands  a  Control 
Coordination Group lays down a work programme for the Dutch customs (who deal with 
export  refunds)· and  for  the  AID  (the  Inspectorate-General  for  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture). 
Other bodies mentioned include the Inspectorate-General of Finances (Portugal, France), 
the lnspectorates-General of the  central government and  the  autonomous communities 
(Spain) and the various national Courts of Auditors (Austria, Sweden). 
29 Some Member States point out that the reform of the common agricultural policy and the 
introduction of direct aids have meant changes  in the  way that controls are organized. 
In France, for example, about a million files have been fed  into the computerized data . 
base used for the purposes of lACS (the integrated administration and control system for 
agricultural aid schemes).· -A special  CICG  training course on the EAGGF Guarantee. 
Section is provided for this purpose.  In the Netherlarids, the controls in question are the 
responsibility of the department which  implements  the rules issued by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  In addition to the lACS checks, physical checks have to be made on income 
aids.  In France this  is done by the payment agencies and the Ministry of Agriculture,' 
while in the Netherlands this task falls  to  the  Inspectorate-General (AID). 
The  organization  of  controls  on  agricultural  expenditure,  as  described  by  the 
Member States,  is  essentially  designed  to  achieve  the  quantitative  targets  set  by  the 
Community rules but the controls in question are seldom conducted independently of the 
payment agency. 
(c)  Structural Funds 
The  descriptions  provided  by  most  Member States  were  at  least  as  detailed  on  the 
management of  the_ Structural Funds as on the controls applied.  The bodies administering 
the funds were described rather than the control structures (internal or external). 
No  attempt will  be made  here  to  compare  the  various  national  arrangements  for  the 
administration of the Structural Funds;  the  reader  is  referred to  the  national reports, 
which  vary  widely.  For  example,  the  administration  of the  European  Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) may be centralized in a single body which allocates sums to 
each  geographical  area  or  it  may  be  shared  out  among  several  ministries  under  a 
management-by-objectives scheme which determines the overall allocation to each type 
of programme,  or  it  may  be decentralized  to  local rauthorities  which  enjoy  varying 
degrees of independence. 
The controls on the  Structural Funds present three  distinct features  which are not  so 
pronounced in the case of other Community resources or expenditure. 
30 The first of  these features is the dominant role of internal audits by the body responsible 
for jmplementing Community schemes.  The auditing C?f accounting records is the most 
common of these controls.  · 
A second feature is the importance of the local authorities, to whom powers may bave 
been delegated or decentralized.  Where local authorities enjoying a degree of  autonomy 
are involved in the administration of  the Structural Funds, the control arrange~  ha~e 
to be adapted s9  that the central government respects these powers.  As a result, tile 
controls  on  the  Structural  Funds  are  governed  by  very  complex  and  diverse 
'  . 
arrangements. 
A  third  feature  is  that  because  the  national  authorities  help  to  finance  structural 
programmes,  "assimilation"  is  achieved de facto,  as can be easily demonstrated:  if a 
programme  is  jointly  financed,  the  Community  share  and  the  national  shate  of 
expenditure are obviously subject to the same management and control principles. 
The  following  table provides  first of all  a  summary of traditional control structures 
(i.e. the controls applied by the department responsible for ifuplementing the Community 
rules and executing the budget) and provides details on three important points.  The fll'St 
of these is whether the funds, which are frequently managed at local level, are subject 
to  centralized  or  decentralized  controls.  The  second  point  concerns  whether  the 
.  ' 
administration of f\mds  is  kept  separate  from the  controls  applied.  The third point 
' 
concerns the  powers held  by  the  control officials,  e.g. whether they  mi.y  carry out 
physical controls on the  spot and  not  simply  checks  on the accuracy of accounting 
records.  The table  also contains  a  column showing  whether there are  any  specific 
structures for the investigation of frauds and irregularities and gives a list of horizontal 
and multidisciplinary control structures. 
Fund  Traditional control structures  SpecifiC  HorizoDialiDd 
Centralized or  Separation of  Physical 
inveacipdon  multidilcipliDary 
ltructurea  atructurel 
decentralized  payment/inspection  controla/powen 
of officials  • 
31 B  BSF  Centralized/  No 
decentralized 
s depanments 




EAGGF  Decentralized  No 
FIFG 
DK  BSF  Centralized  No 
~F  Centralized  No 
Decentralized 
EAOGF  Centralized 
FIFG  ~ized 
D  All  Decentralized  No 
; 
' 
EL  ESF  Centralized  Yes 
.. 





EAGGF  Centralized/  Yes 
decentralized 
,. 
FIFG  Centralized 
-· 
E  All  - Yes 




































































experts  ' 
Federal Co  tirt of 
Auditors; 





Finailc:ial A  ffaira 
Coun of 
Auditors ERDF  regional 
prefects 
EAGGF  regional 
(and Sb)  prefects 
Sa+  Decentralized  -· 
FIFO 
IRL  AU  Centralized  No 
I  AU  Decentralized  Yes, centralized  Tax inspectors  Criminal  1992: 
iDvestiptiOD  ~rial 
and tax  Anti-fraud 
authorities  Committee 
(209a) 
L  - - - - - -
N  ERDF  Decentralized  No  AID 




FIFO  Centralized/  . 
decentralized 
p  All  Cemralized,  No  No  - audits at 
except  miniaterial 
autonomous  level  -





OS  ESF  Centralized 
EAGGF  and 
decentralized 
su  ESF  Ym:x  Yes  On-the-spot 
ERDF  ~lbmwixc  controls by 
EAGGF  description of  inspectors with 
the various  specialstatua 
Ministries' 
powers 
sv  All  in preparation 
UK  ESF  Centralized +  No  Special Audit  Natioaal 
Northern  Department  Criminal 
Ireland  (92)  Intellipnce 
Service 
ERDF  Decentralized  No  No 
EAGGF  Centralized  No  No  Serious Fraud 
Offtce 
The table shows that in most cases the controls are essentially of the traditional kind and 
are carried out by the fund administrators themselves;  the documentary checks are not 
33 accompanied by external on-the-spot checks.  In some Member States such as Portugal, 
specific structures have been established so that controls are applied to all aspects of 
subsidized projects, up to and including paymentS to the recipient.  The United Kingdom 
has such an audit department to deal with the ESF.  In Denmark the introduction of such 
controls  is  being  considered  by  an  interministerial  working ·party  responsible  for 
administering the Structural Funds. 
The reports from Greece, Italy and Finland indicate .that in those countries the payment 
and control agencies are separated, tl'le  fund administrators at local level being subject 
to. controls by a centralized authority. 
In recent years Greece has  altered its  central control structures.  Presidential Decree 
No 394/1991 set up an Inspection Directorate within the Ministry of National Economy, 
which is quite separate from  the  same Ministry's Financial Control Division (ERDF 
management and payments).  For the ESF Greece has established a Secretariat-General 
for  the  Management of Community  Resources  (Act  No 2224/94),  which includes  a 
Control and Assessment Directorate responSible for physical and administrative controls. 
In  the case of the  EAGGF Guidance  Section,  the  Financial  Control  and Inspection 
Directorate of  the Ministry of  Agriculture carries out specific controls if  a fraud has been 
reported or is  suspecte~. 
Italy, for its part, gives greater responsibility for controls to the Guardia di Finanza, a 
multidisciplinary body within which  (according to  a bill before Parliament) a special 
Community fraud prevention unit is to be set up.  Community fraud prevention sections 
have .already been set up at all regional centres of the tax police and have wide-ranging 
investigative powers to assist the monitoring committees in their supen:ision of  Structural 
Fund expenditure at local level. 
Finland, which submitted a very detailed report, has set up national control bodies which 
check on compliance  with  the  instructions  issued  to  the  district  authorities  on the 
management of the  various Funds.  The Internal Audit Office of the  Ministry of the 
Interior is chiefly responsible for the ERDF, whilst the Ministry of  Agriculture's Control 
and Surveillance Department handles the EAGGF Guidance Section and the FIFG, and 
34 the Ministry of Employment deals  with  the  ESF (a  specialized department may make 
on-the-spot checks on ESF expenditure). 
Lastly,  the  Spanish  report  mentiops  the  existence  of a  control  agreement  with  the 
Commission.  Such agreements,  which  are  provided for  by  Article 23  of Reg,ulation 
(EEC)  No 425/88,  have  been  concluded  with  other  countries  but Spain  is the  only 
recipient  of aid  from  the  Cohesion  Fund  which  provides  useful  information  on  th~ 
oraanization of controls in this area. 
Many reports indicate that the Member States entrust external controls on the Structural 
Funds to bodies such as a Court of Auditors or an Inspectorate-General.  :Ii is unlikely, 
however,  that the controls carried out by  such national bodies with very wide-ranging 
powers can be as  frequent and as  detailed as  is  required.  These bodies are therefore 
listed only for the record, where no specialized structures exist.  Besides, there is seldom 
any mention of these high-level structures in the context of own ~sources  or agricultural 
expenditure, although these areas do fall  within their field of c9mpetence. · 
(d)  Provision of assistance to the Commission 
This section deals  with assistance  provided  "when the  C~munission is  responsible for 
certain expenditure in direct contact with the  beneficiary (research, environment ...  )". 
Three reports provided information on this matter. 
The French report stated that the Commission would first of all have to provide relevant 
infonnation on the  expenditure to  be paid  directly  to  the  beneficiary.  Similarly,  the 
Swedish report indicates willingness to cooperate with the Commission but asks for the 
infonnation needed for cooperation on fraud prevention.  Lastly, the United Kingdom 
report singles out three areas (training, research, overseas development) where broader 
cooperation would be desirable with a view to improving the effectiveness of direct 
35 
. \ expenditure, with closer coordination of Community and national spending. 
Aven'* to be explored (point 1.1.2.) 
The Commission draws  two  main conclusions  from  this  comparative  analysis  of the  . 
national organizations for fraud prevention. 
A.  There is a trend towards the development ofmultidisciplinary control structures 
with responsibility for all areas of fraud prevention and with wide-ranging investigative 
powers.  In this way the Member States hope that more effective steps can be taken to 
combat  organi~ fmancial  crime which  is  not  necessarily confined to one particular 
sector. 
There are many  examples  of this.  In  the  United Kingdom  the SFO  (Serious  Fraud 
Office) bas multidisciplinary investigation teams;  in 1992 the NCIS (National Criminal 
Intelligence Service) was set up to combat serious crime, including economic crimes. 
In Belgium the OCDEFO (Central Office for the  Prev~ntion of  Organized Economic and 
Financial Crime) consists of members  of the  Criminal  Investigation Department; the 
Gendarmerie and the esc (a high level control committee) and,  since the Tax Act of 
30 March 1994, officia,ls responsible for customs, direct taxation and VAT.  A general 
directive states that the Office's powers extend to all serious fmancial, economic or tax 
offences  involving  organized  crime,  and  in  particular  fraud  to  the  detriment of the 
fmancial interests of the European Union. 
Similafly, Italian legislation should shortly assign to the Guardia di Finanza the essential · 
task of monitoring and investigating Community fraud, thus makina it a key instrument 
of a policy laid down at the highest level, namely the lntenninisterial Committee for the 
Prevention  of Community  Fraud.  This  Committee  was  set  up,  in  the  spirit  of 
Article 209a of  the Treaty on European Union, by Act No 142 of 19 February 1992 and 
answers to  the  Prime M_inister's  own department  for  the  coordination of Community 
policies, where the operational unit of the Guardia di Finanza established by Decree of 
"  . 
the Prime Minister dated  llJanuary 1995  is located. 
36 This trend,  of which  many  other examples  could  be given,  is  interesting  in that  it 
indicates· how national measu'res 'are being adjusted to combat national and Community  .  .  . 
fraud  which is  not confined to  one particufar sector, although the level of protection 
differs from one sector to another.  It reflects the  special nature of fraud prevention 
work, calling for large-scale investigations and employing highly specific operational 
techniques with recourse to substantial powers of coercion, which are not available to all 
levels of  authority.  Such lengthy investigations, which require the services: of  expe.rts in 
major .fman~ial crime,  frequently  reveal  the  transnational  ramifications  of behaviour 
seriously prejudicial to the Community's financial interests.  Investigations of this kind 
can hardly  be undertaken by  those  responsible  for  routine  controls,  let alone  those 
responsible for the administration of  funds, that is, those whose main task is to implement 
a  programme of expenditure.  They  must  be  undertaken by  departments  with wide 
territorial jurisdiction and with expert investigators who can establish operational links 
with their colleagues in other Member States and with the fraud-prevention depirtments 
at the Commission.  Of the  multidisciplinary units which now exist, several have been 
established as part of a fundamental reorganization of national government departments. 
Any such reorganization has to take account of budgetary constraints and the problems 
of resource allocation (and in particular the availabilitY of staff).  This has meant the 
redeployment  of experts  from  the  traditional  control  departments  within  the  new 
multidisciplinary units.  In the present context this  trend is  bound to provide greater 
protection for the Community's financial interests. 
~-
B.  As regards the administrative organization of  fraud prevention, the national reports 
indicate on the whole that there is a great contrast between the protection of  revenue and 
the protection of  expenditure.  Where revenue is concerned, customs and tax authorities 
have had long experience of fraud prevention and apply  the same control methods to 
Community revenue as have proved their worth in decades of  use at national level.  Both 
national and Community revenue may .thus be said to enjoy a high level of protection. 
Where expenditure is  concerned,  the  "assimilation"  principle is observed in that the 
protection  available  to  Community  expenditure  is  the  same  as  that  for  national 
expenditure.  The rules on public accounts, which protect government spending in all 
Member States, also apply to Community spending, the great bulk of  which is channelled 
through the national budgets.  The protection given to Community interests in this case 
37 is, however, less satisfactory than the  protectio~ given to revenue.  The organization of 
controls  is  often  the  responsibility  of  the  fund  administrators  themselves  or  of 
departments which are relatively unfamil~ar with the techniques for combating orgaDized 
crime.  The staff and the real powers available to inspectors (who are sometimes private 
bodies) are not specified.  There is no information on their powers of  investigation (other 
than those conferred by court order) or the action which inspectors may take on their 
fmdings  when making on-the-spot checks.  The verification of accounts and checks on 
compliance  with  formal  requirements  are  more  common  than  on-the-spot checks  by 
experts, particularly in the case of the Structural Funds.  It might be  ~orth  considering 
an obligation for inspection bodies to establish programmes of  controls like thOse already .. 
operating  in'  some  areas  of  Community  policy  (e.g.  foodstuffs,  under  . 
Regulation No 4045/89), on the basis of  a risk analysis, subject to Commission approval. 
There are few examples of departments responsible for the monitoring of Community 
expenditure w.hich are both independent of  the administrative authorities and experienced 
in the field of fraud ·preVention.  According to the national reports, controls tend to be  .  .  .  . 
the responsibility of ·bodies  whose  work  involves  the  general auditing of govel'lllllent 
departments and ~  verification of accounts rather than detailed checks on Community 
expenditure. 
Between the forces of  diS~uasion represented by high-level institutions, on the one hand, 
and the primary checks carried out by the administrator himself, on the other, there is 
room for specific fraud-prevention ~ontrols carried out by specialists in the fight against 
organized fmancial crime, who should be independent of  the officials administering funds 
and should  hold  wide-ranging  powers  of investigation.  If the controls  applicable  to 
expenditure  could  be  raised  to  the  level  of those  currently  applied  to  revenue,  the 
protection of both national and .Community finances would be considerably enhanced. 
38 1~2.  Evaluation of measures· taken 
The  Com,mission's  aim  is  not  ·only  to  obtain  an  overview  of the  ways  in  which 
Member. States  apply  Article 209a  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (legislation 
applicable, approach adopted to the prevention of Community fraud) but also to evaluate 
the results achieved by the measures taken.  The two years following the Treaty's entry 
into force (1993 and 1994) have been used as a reference basis. 
In accordance with the layout suggested  by  the  Commission,  this report evaluates the 
intelligence,  contt:ol  and  investigation measures adopted  (1.2.1), analyses the  results, 
· Le.  the frauds and  irr~gularities  ct~tected (1.2.2), examines the financial impact of these 
frauds and irregularities (1.2.3) and then considers the administrative and legal measures 
taken in response (  1.2 .4). 
1.2.1. Intelligence, control and investigation measures 
The  following  table  summarizes  the  replies  which  the  national  reports  provided 
\ 
concerning f9ur key issues:-
the existence of statistics on the physical or documentary controls carried out; 
the use of risk-analysis methods for control purposes; 
the administrative or judicial inquiries conducted into the irregularities detected by 
controls; 
initiatives for gathering intelligence relevant to fraud prevention. 
Only half the Member States provided statistical data on the controls carried out.  Given 
the difficulty of  obtaining such data and the short time available~ the figures provided·are 
usually partial, covering only one or two sectors and not broken down in any particular 
way.  They make no distinction betw~en controls and investigations. 
In the following table the answers have been condensed to a simple yes or no to provide 
an overall picture of the· situations described in the reports.  In the case of Sweden and 
Finland the replies relate to national finances. 
39 Controls, investigations and intelligence 
Member State  Statistics provided on  Use of risk analysis  Reference to  Initiatives for the 
physical or  for selection of  administrative or  gatherinJ of 
documentary controls  control targets  judicial inquiries  intelligence 
B  No  No  No  Establishment of 
a specialized 
division 
D  No  Yes  No 
DK  Yes  Yes  Yes  Coordination of 
audits in the case 
of the Structural 
Funds 
EL  No  No  Yes 
Structural Funds 
E  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Own resources 
F  Yes  Yes  No  Alerting of 
customs staff 
IRL  No  No  No 
I  Yes  Yes  Introduction of a 
freephone 
service. 





L  No  No  No 
N  Yes  Yes  No  Preparation of 
sectoral profiles 
OS  No  No  No 
p  Yes  Yes  Yes  Systems audit 
su  Yes  Yes  No  Interdepartmental 
Own resources  Customs  cooperation 
administration  initiated 
whenever 
necessary 






40 UK  Yes  Yes  Yes  Establishment of 
VAT and ESF  a National Fraud 
Working Group. 
lntroductibn of a 
freepbooe 
service  .  (Cuitoms) . 
Use of informers 
(CAP) 
The Spanish report provides relatively detailed statistics not only on customs (targeting  .. 
of  controls on goods in free circulation) and agricultural matters (e.g. olive oil agencies) 
but also on the Structural Funds, which is unusual.  These statistics show that between 
199l and  1994  there  was  a  sharp  increase  in  the  number  of controls  following. 
implementation of the work programme laid down by the National Audit Office.  The 
actual sums controlled increased by 75% in the case of  the EAGGF Guidance Section and 
more than doubled in the case of the  ERDF and the ESF. 
The Portuguese report states that,:to achieve greater effectiveness, a systems audit n9w 
precedes  the  application  of controls,  the  numbers  of  which  have  also  increased 
(8 000 external controls in 1993  but 10 500 in  1994,  with a significant increase from 
2 000 to over 5 000 in the case of the EAOGF Guarantee 'section as a result of more 
frequent checks on cereals). 
The report from the Netherlands, for its part, throws light on how traditional customs 
controls are changing.  Whereas the controls which the Community rules require. in the 
sphere  of the  common  agricultural  policy  have  remained  at  much  the  same  level 
(e.g. Regulation No 386/90 stipulates that 5%  of goods eligible for export refunds must 
be subjected to checks;  this  meant a to.tal  of 21  753 controls in 1992 and 20 552 in 
1993), the number of physical controls on imports fell by more than one third between 
1992 and 1993 (157 716 in 1992 and 94 911  in 1993). 
According  to  the  Netherlands  report,  this  decrease  is  attributable  both  lO  the 
establislunent of the  single  market,  which  has  redu~ the  "total  number of customs 
operations,  and  to  wider. use  of  risk-analysis  techniques,  to  which  the  UK  and 
Netherlands reports are particularly favourable, although the use of risk analysis is also 
mentioned by several other Member States (see table above). 
41 Germany claims to have improved its control system since it introduced risk analysis with 
the Commission's assis~ance in 1993 (for use in the agricultural sector:  export refunds, 
controls pursuant to Regulation No 4045/89).  The Belgian customs now have a special 
risk-analysis division within the  DNR (National Investigation Directorate). 
France and Denmark emphasize the international aspects of fraud.  Denmark has altered 
its routine physical checks on goods transiting through its national territory, relying on 
closer international cooperation to  keep  track of individuals and companies who have 
already committed irregularities.  France points out that no purely national fraud network 
has ever been discovered and has launched a campaign to raise awareness of this among 
its customs staff. 
Three other Member States (Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom) attach great importance 
to the training of inspectors, who are required to have followed a special course or to 
have a university qualification. 
Risk analysis is based on the gathering of intelligence, as is particularly clear from the 
United Kingdom report:  a National Fraud Working Group has been set up to improve 
contact between the banking and financial sector, on the one hand, and investigators, on 
the other, with a view to setting up a data bank on fraud.  In the customs field several 
sources of information are mentioned:  the business world, informers and Commission 
contacts (SCENT messages).  Customs have a specialist VAT intelligence team whose 
tasks include the  analysis of new  VAT  registrations.  In agriculture,  mention may be 
made of the computerized checks on direct aids· under the lACS system and the trials of 
satellite monitoring as a control tool.  To sum up,  it would appear that in this part of 
their national reports the Member States have been more willing to describe qualitative 
changes  than  to  provide  data  on  the  frequency,  thoroughness  and  planning of their 
respective  controls  and  investigations.  Although  reference  is  occasionally  made  to 
administrative  and  judicial  inquiries,  the  statistics  do  not  indicate  any  link  between 
controls and investigations.  Words rather than figures are used to demonstrate that the 
quality of controls has been improved. 
The  layout  suggested  by  the  Commission  made  a  distinction  between  controls  and 
investigations to ensure that Member States would provide a description of the methods 
42 used in each cue.  For example,  investigations  may  be  initiated once controls have 
revealed irregularities (i.e. the investigation is a continuation oftbe.control operation) or 
as  a  result of the  processing  of intelligence  (i.e.  direct action  is taken without any 
controls intervening). 
1.2.2. and 1.2.3.  Results:  frauds and irregularities detected;  fmancial impact 
In almost  all  the  national  reports  these  two  sections  of the  layout  proposed_ by  the 
" 
Commission have been treated as one.  There is some logic in discussing the frauds and 
irregularities detected under the same heading as the sums involved (a), but the question 
ofthe recovery/collection of  the amounts concerned (b) will be discuSsed separately frOiD 
out-of-court settlement (c). 
(a)  Frauds and irregularities discovered and amounts concerned (statistics, case 
study' typolOI)') 
r·.·  .  ., 
The Member States have endeavoured to provide a substantial range of statistics.  The 
other two subjects (case study,  typology),  however, have been given such superficial 
• 
treatment  that  no  worthwhile  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  the  analysis  of 
exemplary cases e.g.  those  presenting  special  problems  (transnational fraud)  and no 
typology has ~n  drawn up, although this could be done on the basis of  Member States'  .  . 
experience of risk analysis  (identification of high-risk sectors, assessment of sectoral 
variability, offender profiles).  The statistics should have accounted for only one third· 
\ 
of  the information provided in this section.  The table below summarizes the information 
contained in the national reports. 
Statisdcs, typoiOI)', recovery 
Member  Delcription  Attempt at  Provision of statistics on  Provision of statistics on 
States  of results in  typology  frauds and irregularities  caJlection aDd reawery 
each sector 
If Yes,  comparison with  If Yes, compariloD_ with 
IRENE base  IRENE 
8  YES  YES  YES.  YES 
except  except Structural Funds  except StrucNrll FUDds 
Structural 
Funds  Comparable data  Comparable data 
43 D  YES except  YES  YES  YES 
Structural  EAGGF Guarantee 
Fupds 
Comparable data for  Comparable data 
EAGGF Guarantee 
Different data for own 
resources 
DK  YES  NO  YES  except own resources  YES except own resources 
Comparable data  Different data 
EL  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Identical data  Different data 
E  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Different data  Different data 
F  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Different data 
IRL  YES except  YES  YES  YES 
Structural  own resources  own resources 
Funds 
Different data  Different data 
IT  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Data taken from this base  Data talcen from this base 
L  NO  NO  NO  NO 
N  YES  NO  YES (EAGGF Guarantee)  NO 
Comparable data 
Os  NO  NO  NO  NO 
p  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Comparable data  Different data 
su  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Data not comparable 
sv  NO  NO  NO  NO 
UK  YES  YES  YES except Structural Funds  YES except Structural Funds 
General 
description  Comparable data  Comparable data for 
EAGGF Guarantee 
Different data for own 
resources 
The  distinction  between  frauds  and . irregularities  has  not . been  made  by  the 
Member States, which treat irregularities (and notify them to the Commission) in terms 
of the sums involved rather than in terms of the seriousness of the offence and whether 
' 
it was intentional or organized.  In the  EAGGF context, however, Portugal does refer 
44 to the Commission document which points out the importance of whether the irregularity 
is intentional or not (Doc. VI/680/89).  The Netherlands report also raises this point in 
connectiot:t with the Structural Funds, emphasizing that it is sometimes difficult to make 
a distinction between a fraud and an  incorrect application of the  rules. 
The  United  Kingdom,  which  does  not  record  frauds  separately  from  irregularities, 
explains its  high total  by  the  fact  that  most of the  irregularities were minor offences 
involving small sums.  The l1nited Kingdom accounts for between 13% and 14% of all 
irregularities notified by the Twelve in 1992 and 1993:  131 of the 1028 reported in 1992 
and 180 of the 1297 reported  in  1993.  In terms of value,  however,  the proportion is 
. much smailer (between 4%  and?.%). 
\ 
In all  other respects  the  descriptions  provided  by  the  Member States were  less  than 
complete.  Cross-checks with  the  Commission's IRENE base  (which  is  fed  the  data 
reported by the Member States) are revealing:  sometimes the data are identical or highly 
comparable, although in two cases there are significant discrepancies.  In the case of  own 
resources  the  data  are  difficult  to  check because  the  report  which  the  Commission 
receives on the  total amounts outstanding does  not provide a breakdown showing  the 
sums defrauded.  In the  case of EAGGF  Guarantee  expenditure,  on the  other hand, 
homogeneous  results·  are  available,  since  the  precise  amounts  involved  have  to  be 
. notified. · Lastly, in the case of the Structural Funds, several Member States point out 
that Regulation No 1681194, which lays down the rules for declaring expenditure to the 
Comrillssion, came into force only recently (1  July  1994) and that, as a rule, there has 
been insufficient time to collect the  relevant data. 
Where a comparison can be made between the sums defrauded (and detected) in 1993 
and  1994, the  figures  show  a rise,  ranging  in some cases up to  a threefold increase. 
Caution must, of course, be exercised when analysing the statistics on detected frauds, 
which might indicate an increase in the activities of fraud prevention departments or an 
improvement in the reporting of statistics rather than any real increase in fraud itself. 
The German report, for example, states that the sums involved in frauds to the detriment 
of  the EAGGF Guarantee Section increased from ECU 20.3 million to ECU 33.7 million 
and that the sums defrauded from traditional own resources rose from ECU 23 million 
45 to ECU 86.4 million.  The number of cases reported was also on the increase, but it is 
reasonable to assume, like the German report itself, that these figures are attributable to 
closer  ~rgeting of  controls as a result of the risk-analysis techniques introduced in 199~. 
Generally speaking, one has to allow for more accurate recording of detected fraud, as 
the higher figures are unlikely to indicate a spectacular expansion of fraudulent activities 
detrimental to Community interests.  Only some years from  now will it be possible to 
make any proper assessment of the fraud statistics, hence the need to present and analyse 
case studies and to record any facts on which a typology of Community fraud could be 
based. 
No  link  is  made  between  the  number  of controls  carried  out  and  the  number  of 
irregularities discovered, except occasionally in relation to the agricultural sector.  The 
Netherlands  report  states  that  under  the  national  control  programme  for  1993/94, 
provi$ion was made for 336 controls, of which 289 were seen through to a conclusion, 
most of  them (227) involving the inspection of accounts in excess of ECU 200 000.  The 
number of irregularities reported  under  Regulation  No 595/91  was  59.  The French 
report also establishes a link (in the  EAGGF Guarantee context) between the controls 
carried out and the  irregularities discovered:  15%  of controls led to  178 fmns being 
asked to make repayments;  in three quarters of these cases, the amounts concerned were 
less than ECU  10 000 (1994 figures).  In France the number of corrections bas been on 
the decrease, falling from 274 in 1992 to 220 in 1993 and 178 in 1994.  Under the lACS 
system, penalties were imposed on 13 000 beneficiaries of aids for crop-growing,  ~.e. a 
quarter of all the farmers inspected.  One tenth of this number (1  300) were penalized 
by  the  total  withdrawal  of aid.  Among  livestock  farmers  the  percentage  of those 
penalized was lower (4%). 
The  report  from  Portugal  indicates  that  in  1994  the  number  of EAGGF  Guarantee 
controls  was  higher  than  in  1993  (5  000  as  compared  with  2 000);  the  number  of 
irregularities detected was down, however, from 193 to 103 whilst the amounts involved 
remained stable at roughly ECU 4.5 million. 
Turning from the agricultural sector, one might compare the  180 000 detailed controls 
carried out by the French customs with the number of fraud cases reported m  the field 
of traditional own resources  (151  cases  involving  ECU 27.5 million in 1993  and 221 
46 cases  involving  ECU 72.4 million  in  1994,  although  these  figures  include  the  sums 
.  . 
·defrauded in export refunds). 
Certain Member States (shown in the table as having attempted to provide a t)lK>logy)  . 
identify particular types of fraud.  The French report, having mentioned the main fraud 
cases  in  1994,  outlines  a  method  of risk  analysis  which  could  be  developed  from 
objective bases such as product levies, high levels of aid, or products or :neighbouring 
.  .  . 
countri~s to which different tariff rates apply.  The other reports mention the prOducts 
and procedures with which fraud is particularly associated. 
The most frequent type of fraud is that involving tobacco and cigarettes.  It is mentioned 
in  the  reports  from  Germany,  Belgium,  Spain,  France,  Ireland  and  Italy.  The 
agricultural products singled out in national reports include beef (mentioned by Belgium, 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom), sheepmeat (Germany, Italy and Portugal), 
milk products (Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom), cereals (Germany and 
Portugal)  and  olive  oil  (Spain,  Italy  and  Portugal).  Industrial  goods  are  rarely 
mentioned, with the exception of textiles.  Customs offences receive the most frequent 
/ 
mention, with several reports dwelling on frauds affecting Community or international 
l!ansit (Belgium, Spain, France and Italy). 
The Commission would have preferred closer attention being paid to typology and case 
studies so that guidelines could have been worked out for fraud prevention on the basis 
of specific cases, with explanations for any successes achieved and observations on the 
difficulties encountered and needing to be overcome.  In the Commission's view, there 
is  a  need  not  only  for  statistics  based  on mandatory  reports  but  also  for  accurate 
information on the real problems of fraud prevention, particularly in the transnational 
context (including  organized  financial  crime)  so  that  the  Commission can adapt  its 
strategy to the  needs of the Member States and ensure that they have the appropriate 
instruments at their disposal. 
The Commission and the Member States will have to work together on this material, 
I 
which reflects the real situation, so that a multiannual action programme can be drawn 
up which is commensurate with the extent of the problem and takes account of trends in 
fraudulent activities. 
47 (b)  Collection and recovery of sums due 
On the basis of the national reports the Commission has drawn up two summary tables. 
one concerning the recovery of Community own resources and the other concerning the 
recovery of undue expenditure. 
•  Recovery of own resources 
(all amounts are expressed in millions of ecus;  conversions from national currencies to the ecu 
are based on the  rate  for September  1995;  the  data taken from  the IRENE base reflect the 
situation as  known at  31  August 1995;  where  boxes  have  been  left empty.  there  has  been 
insufficient accurate information to answer the questions posed)  · 
Recovery of own resources 
Member  Amounts involved in frauds  and  Amounts recovered (in  IRENE bue: 
States  irregularities  brackets: rate of recovery  amounts 
according to national report)  recovered in 
1991-94 (rate of 
.  recovery) 
B  1993: 25 (US cases involving  1993: 2.2 (8.8~)  8.3  (8.3~) 
over E~U.10.9QO}  1994: 0.967  (l.S~). for 48 
1994: 66.1  (138 cases)  files closed 
DA  Rcvc~  2.8 (41 ~) 
1993:· S8S repayments 
demanded, totalling ECU 7.4 
million  ., 
Checks on  tr"vell~n: 1 S74 
customs reports,.· corresponding 
to ECU 9.8 milliOn 
CoD1ml g( iks;lll:aliml:i 
1993: 24.9 repaid 
1994:  10.9 repaid 
D  1993: 23 (202 cases)  8.2 (4~) 
1994:  86.4 (790 cases) 
,. 
EL  1991-94: 3.2 (66 cases)  0 
E  Total duties reusessed:  1 (7.3) 
1993:  16.9  1993:  11.1  (66%) 
1994:  17.2  1994:  10.3  (60~) 
F  . 
1993: S S  13 infringements in  S (S.S~) 
agriculture: duty involved:  14.4 
21  188 infringements relating to 
industrial goods; duty  involved: 
13.1 
1994:  3 461  infringements in 
agriculture; duty involved: 25 
27  127 infringements involving 
industrial goods:  40.4 
48 
.. IRL  1992193: 2.4 (import duties  so~ of this amount wu  1.' (12~) 
evHed)  recovered 
January-Juue 1994:  amounts  40~ of this amount was 
unpaid: 0.6  recovered 
I  1991-94: 92.S (408 cases)  - 0.7 (0.8~). correspondina to  0.7 (6.6~) 
41  files closed 
L 
N  Report states total amount of  0.12 (1.3~) 
duty reclaimed without separate 
indicllion of fnud cases  . 
OS 
p  1993:  1.3  1993: o.ss  (42~)  0.74 (24~) 
(of which 0.8 in cases involving 
over ECU  10 000)  : 
1994:  1.8  1994: o.s  (29~) 
(of which  1 in cases involving 
over ECU  10 000) 
su 
sv 
UK  1993-94  1.~ (1:8") 
Rate of recovery in cases: 
concluded:  98.86,., 
correspondina to· ECU 46.4 
million 
ECU O.S33 million  (1.14~ of 
fmal  figures) wu deemed 
irrecoverable and written off 
Meaningful comparisons  are  often difficult  to  make  since  the  data  provided are  not 
homogeneous.  In the case of  the United Kingdom a very high rate of  recovery (98.86%) 
was obtained by considering only those recovery procedures which had been taken to a 
conclusion, leaving only 1.14% of own resources deemed irrecoverable and thus written 
off.  The balance has not,  in fact,  been recovered but is still to be recovered.  On the 
other hand, the low Italian rate (0.8%) was obtained by considering the number of  cases 
wound up in relation to the total amount of own resources due.  Belgium, Spain, Ireland 
and Portugal, however. provide a basis for comparison between the total own resources 
to be collected and  the corresponding amounts recovered.  The rate of recovery falls 
short of  SO%  in all cases except Spain, where all reassessed duties are taken into account 
(and not simply the amounts defrauded). 
49 The data are more reliable where the sums defrauded are in excess of ECU 10 000, for 
such  cases  have  to  be  reported  to  the  Commission  every  six  months 
(Regulation No 1552/89), whereas there is no such obligation to report the sums actually 
~vered. 
The national reports devote only a few  Jines  to  the recovery of own resources, even 
though it is essential to the implementation of the  "assimilation" principle.  Traditional 
own resources must be collected with the same efficiency as national resources, but the 
reports do not demonstrate that this is so.  In most cases the facts on which any opinion 
could be based have been omitted. 
No mention is made of  the legislative texts which give priority to public creditors (e.g. in 
cases of fraudulent ba~ptcy),  with the result that it cannot be ascertained whether the 
Community  creditor  is  treated  in  the  same  way  as  the  national  creditor  (with  the 
exception  of the  Netherlands).  The  assimilation  principle  requires,  however,  that 
Community tax entitlements (such as customs duties) must be given the same priority as 
entitlements that are purely national (direct taxation) or primarily national (VAT). 
The question concerning recovery procedures has thus gone unanswered.  The replies 
should have given a picture of  the structures responsible for recovery (indicating whether 
they were singular or dual  in nature and  whether identical procedures were used for 
traditional own resources and VAT).  The links between the departments responsible for 
recovery and other investigative departments have· not been described.  If  these links 
were known,  it would  be  eas~er to  gauge  (in the  course  of fmancial  monitoring  at 
Community level) what stage of  the recovery procedure had been reached by the Member 
State. 
To prevent the  cancellation of debts,  the  periods of limitation and  the  rules  on the 
suspension of time limits should be harmonized. 
Denmark,  for  its  part,  would  like  to  se~  improvements  in  the  mutual  assistance 
arrangements relating to recovery,  which are governed by  Council Directive 76/308. 
This Directive  should  be amended  to  take  account of the  single market and so  that 
Member States can provide mutual assistance with the recovery of own resources. 
50 France  draws  attention to the  active  contribution  which  it  is  making  to  the  smooth 
operation of the single market.  It notifies the country of entry, which is competent to 
recover amounts and prosecute offences, of the outcome of its checks on goods in free 
circulation.  This  approach  could  be  adopted  by  all  concerned  as  part  of  the 
harmonization of recovery  procedures.  It  helps  to ensure  that controls  at external 
frontiers are more effective overall. 
. 
Similarly, the rules on the lodging and forfeiture of securities should be clarified and 
harmonized. 
•  Recovery of undue expenditure 
(all amounts are expressed in millions of ecus and relate to the EAGGF ~ee  Section unless 
otherwise specified;  conversions  from  national  currencies  to  ecus  are  based on the  rate for 
September 1995;  the data taken from the IRENE base telate to the EAGGF Guarantee Section 
and .reflect ·the  situation  as  known  at  31  August 1995;  any  boxes  left empty indicate  that 
insufficient accurate information was available to answer the questions posed) 
Recovery of expenditure 
Member  Amounts involved in frauds and  Amounts recovered (in brackets:  IRENE bale: 
States  irregularities  rate of recovery u  a percentap of  amounts 
the total amounts to be recovered,  recovered in 
according to natioaal report)  1991-94 (rate 
of recovery) 
B  1993:  6.1  (21  cases involving  1993: ECU ~  .332  (0.8~). 1' files  0.866 <'~) 
more than ECU 4 000)  still open,  including 12 relatina to 
1994:7.1 (42cases)  export refunds (';9 at stake) 
1994:  0.2~ (3.'">·  18 files cloaed 
DA  1993: '(73 cues involving  1993: '2"  5.4 (,1~) 
over ECU 4 000) 
1994:  3.3 (91  cues) 
EAGGF Guidance 
1993:  3S cases detected 
1994:  47 
D  1993: 20.3 (177 cases)  1993: 3.8 for  99 cases (18.7")  12.6 (19") 
1994:  33.7 (226 cases)  1994:  3.3 for  109 cases (9.8") 
EL  EAGGF Guanntee and  EAGGF Guarantee and  ,8.3 (67.5") 
Structural Funds  Structural Funds 
1991-94 figures taken from  idem 
Commission's last annual  report  ESF - amounts recovered: 
- 1.2 (1990-93 programmes) 
1.8 (8%) for 69 cases (ECU 0.14) 
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' E  1992193: 5.8 (175 ex post  1992/93: 0.6 (10.3")  2.4 (2.9%) 
checks)  1993/94: 0.2 (0.7%) 
1993/94: 28 (96 ex post checks) 
Structural Funds:  Structural Funds: 
1993: EAGGF Guidance and  1993: EAGGF Guidance and 
Fisheries: 0.6 (21  cases);  Fisheries: 0.14 (23%); ESF: 1.4 
ERDF: 1.9 (18 cases); ESF: 6.6  (21.2~) 
(80 eases).  1994:  EAGGF Guidance and 
1994:EAGGFGuiD~eand  Fisheries: 0.12 (4.3%); ERDF: 1 
Fisheries: 2.8 (lOS'; ERDF:  (8.6%); ESF: 0.3 (20%) 
11.6 (17); ESF:  lS (397) 




IRL  2.34 (38%) 
I  1991-94 fJ.gUres  taken from  1991-94 figures taken from  93.3 (16.7%) 
CommissiOn's last IQDual  repo~t  Commission's last annual repon 
L 
N  11.4 (~%) 
Os 
p  1993: 4.5 (17 .2 in expenditure)  1993: 0.7 (15.3%)  1.23 (8.7%) 
1994: ·4 (5.3 in expenditure)  1994: o.s (29%) 
Structural Funds (1994):  Structural Funds (1994): 
ERDF: 0.51 (0.95 in  ERDF: 0.27 (52.6%) 
expenditure)  ESF:  100% 
ESF: 0.06 (0.11 in expenditure)  EAGGF Guidance: 0% 
EAGGF Guidance: 0.02 (0.03 
in expenditure). 
su 
.  sv 
UK  1991-94: 26.4  1991-94:  12.7 (48%)  11.6 (43.3%) 
The  reports  provide  very  little  information  on how  expenditure  unduly  incurred  is 
recovered.  The Finnish report mentiOns a procedure whereby the body respomible for 
the administration of  funds is given the task of  recovering expenditure under the EAGGF 
Guarantee Section or Structural Funds.  In Portugal the payment agencies have to call 
in  the securities if  an irregularity is detected before their -release;  otherwise the recovery 
of expenditure is delayed by the slowness of  judicial proceedings. 
Broadly  speaking,  for  the  purposes  of both  repayment  (expenditure)  and  recovery 
(revenue), stronger links should be developed between the departments responsible for 
controls and investigations and those responsible for repayments or recovery.  Although 
52 in most cases the Member States claim to  have a department responsible for collection 
and  recovery  procedures,  it  is  e'ssential  that  such. departments  are  informed of any 
investigations as soon as possible.  Otherwise frauds and irregularities are detected but 
the amounts defrauded cannot be recovered because proceedings have been initiated at 
too late a date (periods of limitation, cancellation of debts). 
Information  channels  must  be  improved  and  the  details  to.  be  provided  must  be 
harmoriized. .  Tbe  Commission,  for  its  part,  must  be  in  a  position  to  provide· the 
. budgetary authority with all the  facts  and figures  relevant to an investigation.  These 
cannot be obtained by the  investigation teams alone,  for they  relate essentially to the 
financial consequences and the eventual fate  of the amounts concerned. 
(c)  Out-of-court settlement of the amounts concerned 
This type of settlement is not clearly described in all the national reports.  It appears to 
have been omitted by five Member States or else treated in a wider context together with 
the question of the out-of-court settlement of penalties. 
/ 
The purpose of this section was to check whether the various national systems observed 
the principle that no compromise was possible on sums due (the settlement of penalties 
was to be dealt with below, under point 1.2.4).  Several reports did deal with settlement 
at this stage, altijough in most cases the wording cast doubt on the scope and purpose of 
this exercise. 
Italy and Portugal were the only Member States which made it clear that out-of-court 
settlements were not part of their legal system.  Finland explicitly ruled out any such 
settlement in the  customs context.  France,  for  its  part,  stated that one of its  chief 
concerns was to safeguard the effectiveness of its existing criminal law as applied to 
customs matters,  but the  French report did  not mention the  concept of "settlement". 
Luxembourg and Belgium completely ruled out any settlement of the principal (the duty 
evaded),  although  this  did  not  include  fines.  The  Commission  had  hoped  for 
• 
reaffirmation of the principle that no deals could be struck on the amounts involved but 
the  descriptions  given  in the  reports  indicate  that  confusion  still  reigns  as  regards 
settlement of the amounts concerned and settlement of the fine.  To avoid any departure 
53 from  the  layout  proposed,  further ·consideration  will  be  given  to  these  matters  in 
point 1.2.4 below. 
1.2.4.  Follow-up measures 
(a)  National and Community administrative penalties 
The  Member  States  did  not  reply  to  the  question  on  national  and  Community 
administrative penalties.  In particular,  they  failed  to  give any  information on which 
authOrities could impose such penalties or on the number of cases. 
According to the reports, the national authorities make effective use of  Community CAP 
penalties, designed to ensure that the system of subsidies and· intervention measures is 
implemented in strict 'accordance with the rules and in a uniform manner. However, with 
the exception of  a f~w  pi~s  of information in the Danish report on Community penalties 
.  . 
in connection with ~·  ~tegrated management system, there were no statistics showing 
how widely Community administrative penalties were use(! in practice. 
There  is  a  wide  variety  of. national  administrative  penalties,  which  are  simply  not 
mentioned in some of the reportS.  However,  tllere are administrative penalties for the 
'  .  '  ' 
majority of cases, most of  .them geared towards safeguarding revenue. 
.  .  . 
The Spanish report mentions a system of national administrative penalties covering all 
.  . 
cases of fraud concerning· subsidies,  whether  at  national  or Community  level.  These 
penalties, provided for by the Spanish law .on public spending (1991), are complemented 
by other penalties under general ·tax legislation.  The Portuguese report also describes 
certain national penalties regarding expenditure, e.g. removal of  entitlement to subsidies, 
withdrawal of approval for  olive  oil  producers,  refusal to  acknowledge  good  repute, 
needed to qualify for assistance etc. 
The  United Kingdom does  not use  national administrative penalties for  the  Guaralitee 
Section of  the EAGGF or the Structural Funds, but does for VAT (more specifiCally for 
irregularities involving small .sums,  failure  to register, failure to present accounts etc.) 
and  customs  (civil  penalties,  provided  for. by  the  Finance  Act  1994)  and  will  start 
54 imposing  them  in 1996  for  breaches  of customs  regulations.  The same goes  for  the 
Netherl.ands: when the tax is recovered, the collector or customs representative may fine 
the debtor. an amount equal to or greater than the tax due. 
There are no general systems of administrative penalties in any of the Member States. 
Instead,  the  rules on penalties tend,  as  in  Belgium,  to  be  split between a number of 
measures, each covering a specific area. 
The conclusions set out in part 1.1.1 are also true of administrative penalties. If  we wish 
to prevent the various approaches to  dealing with fraud from diverging too much, we  . 
· ~ust push  for  greater  harmonization  and  homogeneity  of national  administrative 
penalties, ensuring that Community expenditure is  systematically covered. 
(b)  Criminal penalties 
According to the information available, several dozen prosecutions are brought each year 
for fraud affecting the Community budget.  It is  difficult to make a direct comparison 
\ 
given the diversity of the reference bases.  For example, Portugal took the number of 
cases opened (34 in 1993 and 46 in 1994) and the number closed in the same years (59 
and 100 respectivelyr The United Kingdom took 1992 and 1993 as its reference years 
.  and gave figures for the· Guarantee Section of the EAGGF (20 prosecutions in 1992 and 
31  in 1993) and VAT (136 and 109 respectively). Belgium provided statistics on cases 
brought by the customs authorities (47 in 1993 and 24 in 1994). In the cases which were 
settled in those  years  (11  in  1993  and  8  in  1994),  only  1%  of the  total amounts  in 
question were actually recovered. The Spanish report gave details of cases pending (17) 
and referred to the prison sentences passed in certain fraud cases affecting the Guarantee 
Section of the EAGGF. It also contained information on a number of cases concerning 
the  Structural Funds which had  been referred to  the  legal authorities by the relevant 
management  bodies  or  inspectorates.  The  majority  of reports  did  not  refer  to  the 
Structural Funds in the section on follow-up measures. 
The  Netherlands  reported  higher  figures  (447  in  1992  and  369  in  1993),  but these 
referred  to  all  cases  brought  to  the  attention  of the  public  prosecutor  by  the  tax 
information and inquiries department (customs and tax fraud, with no separate figure for 
55 fraud affecting the Community Budget).  Only the Italian report quoted a higher figure 
than this. At the end of 1993, there were 1489 prosecutions pending for fraud affecting 
the Community budget. In the course of that year, 287 verdicts had been delivered, ~itb 
61  convictions. Following a clamp-down, 66 convictions had been secured by the end of 
the first half of 1994. The Italian and the Belgian reports both called for more effective 
statistics to help them monitor prosecutions. 
We support this idea as a way of providing information on the outcome (dismissal, out-
of-court settlement, prosecution, conviction,  recovery etc.) of criminal cases of fraud 
affecting the Community budget. It would also satisfy the Budget Authority's reasonable 
requests for this type of information.  A more detailed analysis is  needed here. 
(c)  .Link between administrative and judicial procedures 
The reports reveal that, in most Member States, administrative and judicial procedures 
exist side-by-side.  The  UK's report gives  the  most detailed explanation of why  both 
administrative and criminal penalties are needed: they serve different functions, with the 
former being used to ensure sound management of the Community's finances and the 
latter to punish serious offences.  The French report, on the other hand, admits on the 
very  first  page  that the  co-existence  of two  parallel  procedures is  a major cause for 
concern. The Spanish report indicates quite clearly that national administrative penalties 
are not imposed in cases where criminal proceedings are brought. 
However,  the  fact  that  there  are  two  procedures  and two  sets  of penalties does  not 
prevent the courts from taking precedence. In Luxembourg, for example, administrative 
proceedings can be suspended when a case involving financial resources is referred to 
an  examining  magistrate.  Similarly,  the  Greek  report  reveals  that  administrative 
proceedings may be suspended until the criminal proceedings have been closed. 
The principle of the precedence of the courts is particularly strong in Italy. When a fine 
is  not  paid,  the  criminal  court  has  jurisdiction  over  the  criminal  offence  and  the 
administrative penalty, and will adjudicate o~  both in a single judgment. In Germany, an 
administrative penalty imposed in a case involving customs or taxes may be contested in 
56 the criminal court, which must suspend proceedings if a preliminary ruling is required 
from the administrative or tax courts. 
The UK report suggests that Member States be allowed under Community legislation to 
defer the imposition of  administrative penalties until legal proceedinzs have been closed. 
This would enable them to impose a harsher administrative penalty if it was shown that 
the offence was committed with intent. 
.. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Dutch report ta'kes the non bis in idem principle to 
mean that it is  not possible to  press criminal charges against. someone and impose an 
administrative  fine.  Consequently,  tax  or  customs  fines  are  lifted  when  criminal 
proceedings relating to the same facts are finally closed, even if the outcome is an out-of-
court settlement. 
(d)  Link between preliminary and judicial stages 
'·  ··J 
The national reports contain little  information in this  section.  In the United Kingdom 
there are no official preliminary proceedings, though the Criminal Justice Act 1987 deals  . 
with preliminary matters more formally.  Most of the reports avoid the issue. 
The Dutch report reveals that, in 1993, notification, settlement and prosecution guidelines  . 
were introduced with the aim of clarifying what action should be taken in response to tax 
and  customs  offences.  The  public  prosecutor  and  the  investigation  service  are  to 
cooperate to consider factors such as the amount involved, previous offences, forgery and 
the implications for other transfers of Community revenue.  The purpose is to use the 
criminal justice system to the best effect in dealing with fraud.  The Portuguese report 
describes yet another ap:proach.  Three authorities are involved when fraud is detected: 
the disbursing authority, the relevant committee within the central administration and the 
public prosecutor. 
• 
In the section on cooperation, some Member States have chosen to stress how important 
it is for the departments involved in both the preliminary and the judicial stages to work 
together. 
57 (e)  Referral of case to judicial authorities 
The Member States divide  into  two  categories:  those  which require that the  case be 
referred to the legal authorities (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and thos_e which 
encourage out-of-court settlements (e.g.  Belgium,  Ireland and the  Netherlands).  The 
reports  do  not  give  statistics,  except  the  UK  report,  which  discloses  the  amounts 
recovered through out-of-court and amicable settlements in connection with the common 
agricultural  policy  and  own  resources.  The  Spanish  clearly  states  that  national 
administrative  penaltie~ are not applied when criminal proceedings are also in course. 
There is really only one area where the  reports provide enough information to enable a 
rough  comparison to  be  drawn:  out-of-court  settlements  relating  to  traditional  own 
resources. The results are summarized in the table  belo~. 
Princ:lples aovernlnJ out-of-court settlements: traditional own .-ources 
Member  Possibility of out-of- Authority responsible  Discretionary powers or criteria for 
State  court settlement for  for out-of-court  using out-of-court settlement 
· custoins fraud  settlement 
B  Yes, under section 263  Customs  Out-of-court settlement not 
of the General Customs  administration  permitted for premeditated fraud or 
and Excise Act  in case where there is sufficient 
evidence for legal action. 
DK  Yes,  for customs duties  Customs  Possible for amounts too small for 
(not specified for  administration  prosecution under criminal or 
agricultural levies)  customs law 
D  Point not dealt with 
EL  Point not dealt with 
E  No out-of-court 
settlement allowed 
F  Point not dealt with 
IRL  Yes (in connection  Customs  Discretionary powers 
with own resources,  administration 
according to report) 
I  No 
L  Yes  Information not  Out-of-court settlement possible for 
given  fmc, not for amount due. 
NL  Yes (through legal  Public prosecutor  No particular criteria (Anicle 167 
procedure)  of the criminal code applies -
principle of appropriateness of legal 
action 
58 p  No 
0  Point not dealt with 
su  ·No: no out-of-court 
settlement possible for 
customs 
sv  Point not dealt with 
UK  Yes  Customs and Excise  Out-of-court settlement used as 
secondary option.  Legal action is 
taken wherever possible. 
Three other pieces of information can be  extracted from the reports:  the Dutch report 
revoals  that amicable settlements are rare  in  the  case of irregularities relating to  the 
common agricultural policy; the Irish that criminal proceedings are uncommon in cases 
involving own resources and the Belgian that 5% of customs fraud cases reach the courts. 
Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom explain that certain criteria relating to the 
seriousness of the offence are taken into account. Out-of-court settlements are possible 
only· where there was  no  intention to defraud or where the amounts involved were to 
small for  prosecution or other legal action. 
As in other parts of the report, little mention is made of VAT cases in the section on out-
of-court settlements. Two Member States report that there is provision for out-of-court 
settlements and that the rules are the s;me as for tFaditional own resources - evidence of 
a parallel approach for two different types of Community own resources. In Denmark, 
the customs and VAT authorities use out-of-court settlements in their respective areas of 
activity where the amount in question are too small for prosecution. In the Netherlands, 
the public prosecutor may opt for an out-of-court settlement for VAT (as for customs 
duties) if legal action is deemed inappropriate. Only the UK report gives figures for the 
amount of VAT recovered through amicable settlements. These relate to  1991-94. 
The other Member States gave  no  reply  or provided  information on traditioqal  own 
resources only, making it impossible to assess the similarities between the various types 
of  own  resources  or  to  conclude  whether  out-of-court  settlements  are  used  for 
irregularities affecting one source of revenue more  than for another. 
59 More often than not, the reports neglected to deal with out-of-court settlements for fraud 
affecting  expenditure.  These  are  not  allowed  in  principle  under Italian,  Spanish or 
Portuguese law. ~n the Netherlands, on the other hand, out-of-court settlements (which 
are themselves legal procedures) are possible for fraud affecting expenditure. The UK 
also has a procedure for making out-of-court settlements with recipients of  CAP funding 
but its use by Customs and  Excise is  restricted to cases of administrative error. The 
Finnish authorities have discretionary powers to settle out of  court but the report indicates 
that compromise solutions are rare. 
In  Member  States  where  there  is  no  provision  for  out-of-court  settlements,  the 
responsibility  for  bringing legal  action  lies  with  the  authority  which discovered the 
offence. In the UK, which does allow out-of-court settlements, the head of the Serious 
Fraud Office may, on his own initiative, investigate cases which he thinks involve serious 
or complex fraud.  He may also prosecute. 
The lack of detailed replies in the national reports makes it impossible to assess whether 
or not  the  rules  governing  out-of-court  settlements  for  fraud  affecting  Community 
revenue and expenditure are the same as those for fraud affecting public funds at national 
level. The only clear conclusion that can be drawn is  that there is a need for greater 
clarity and openness with regard to the guiding principles, the more detailed, practical 
rules and the scope for out-of-court settlements. In view of the results of the study, the 
Commission intends to raise the issue of out-of-court settlements again at a later date. In 
particular, it wishes to examine the principle of bringing the "assimilation principle" and 
the effectiveness of administrative and criminal penalties. 
(f)  Partie ci'vile or equivalent measures 
Italy's  report  points  out  that  the  Commission  is  entitled  to  be  party  to  criminal 
proceedings and encourages it to play a more active role. The Commission enjoys the 
same right in Spain, though it has nevef exercised it according to the Spanish report. 
Like Spain, where the Advocate-General is party to civil proceedings in cases of fraud 
affecting the Community's financial interests, the UK also uses civil actions to recover 
funds.  The motivation is  financial.  It should be possible to carry out a more  detaile~ 
60 analysis of  the role of the Treasury, which represents the Community's financial interests 
in criminal proceedings. 
In other Ca$eS,  the purpose of the Commission's involvement would be to help prove in 
the criminal courts that  th~ alleged fraud  had been committed. 
(g)  National measures taken or planned to avert risk of repetition 
The aim here was to collect information on which to base ideas for action at Community 
level. However,  the  heading  was  often taken to  refer to  measures against recidivism 
(double penalty under the Genera~  Custom and Excise Act of 7 July  1994 in Belgium and 
heavier fines in Luxembourg). The target is systematic fraud, committed by people for 
whom it is  their main activity. 
Italy and Portugal both draw attention to the effectiveness of  precautionary measures such 
as  suspending  payments  or  restricting  access  to  certain  schemes.  This  approach 
presupposes that the authorities responsible for making payments are informed when a 
',  fraud  offence  has  been committed  so  that  it  can stop  payments  to  the  businesses  in 
question. 
The UK reports that it· has undertaken a study on the methods used by the perpetrators 
of fraud. Information on VAT and customs-fraud techniques has been distributed within 
the relevant departments to help them with prevention. Liaison officers working on tax 
fraud have been sent on exchanges to Belgium, France and the Netherlands. 
(h)  Suggestions for Community measures 
The· measures suggested by  the  Member States can be  broken down into three basic 
groups, summarized by three words:  simplification, harmonization and cooperation. 
Legislative simplification is mentioned in a number of reports (e.g. France, Luxembourg 
and  the  Netherlands).  Exactly  what  such  simplification  should  entail  has  yet  to  be 
specified- separately for each area no doubt.  For example, the Spanish report refers to 
the need for further reforms to agricultural rules in order to arrive at a simple, uniform 
61 system of offences and penalties. The Dutch report suggests paying greater attention to 
problems  with  implementation,  monitoring  and  application.  It recommends  that  the 
Commission launch study programmes to examine the application of  standards (includiq 
an examination of the cost of application as a proportion of the overall cost of a policy) 
and, at the same time, assess programmes already implemented. This suggestion ties in 
with  the  Dutch  authorities'  idea  of  carrying  out  regular  audits  to  measure  the 
effectiveness of Community arrangements. Taking part in these national activities would 
be one way for the Commission to become involved in assessment. 
Harmonization is called for in a number of areas: harmonization of penalties to ensure 
that  the  perpetrators of fraud  are  dealt with  in the  same  way  in all  Member States 
(Belgian report) or to ensure that intra-Community tax fraud is dealt with in a uniform 
manner  (UK  report}  and  harmonization of prevention measures  - the  French report 
suggests that the Community adopt a regulation on monitoring of the Structural Funds 
and standard administrative penalties, and raises the issue of  uniform status of  inspectors 
arrangements. The UK also suggests considering the possibility of giving investigators 
similar powers. 
There is actually a separate section of the report on cooperation but we will summarize 
the suggestions made in this part of the  report.  Portugal wanted to·see stronger links 
between the national authorities and the Commission, especially UCLAF, in the shape 
of exchanges of information on businesses, training at Commission level on Community 
~ 
regulations and  risk analysis techniques,  and exchanges between the  Member States. 
Greece called for the creation of special investigation and prosecuting units in all the 
Member  States.  These  would  be  in  direct  contact  with  the  relevant  Commission 
departments.  Spain  wanted  controls .on  Community  transit  operations  to  be  more 
coordinated  and  called  for  greater  coordination  between  national  and  Community 
controls. 
Avenues to be explored (1.2.) 
This  section on the  effectiveness  of anti-fraud  measures  is  based  on the  practices 
established by the budgetary authority (Parliament) and the Commission. The aim is to 
extract  the  maximum  benefit  from  the  knowledge  we  have  of the  field  based  on 
62 infonnation collected and studies of model cases. We must first deal with the questions  . . 
of principle before putting forward ideas on the type of measures Which might be taken 
to reduce the risk of fraud. 
The Member States report an increase in the figures for fraud between 1993 and 1994: 
the two reference years,  though it is hard to say whether the figures  reflect a genuine 
increase in fraud, better statistics, more effective controls or improved detection. There 
is also e.vidence of a growing awareness of the  transnational charaCter of fraud,  with  . 
many of the Member States citing this as the motivation behind the measures they are 
taking  (transit controls  in  Denmark, .checks  on  goods  in  free  circulation in  France, 
exchange schemes for tax liaison officers in the  UK etc.) 
•  I 
The results give a broad idea of the level of assimilation. Better information is needed  . 
however.  It  is  impossible  to  assess  how  well  Article 209a  is  being  implemented  in 
practice without certain key data, such as the number of  controls carried out in each area, 
• 
the number of in-depth inspections carried out following on from the controls (or as a 
result  of information  from  other  sources),  without  the  results  of the  controls  and 
/ 
investigations (into simple irregularities and cases of fraud) and without the most basic 
infonnation as to the measures taken (e.g. recovery and appropriate administrative and 
legal penalties). The Community is quite obviously only part-informed at present; it needs 
to know about all the  links  in the chain before it can measure the effectiveness of the 
anti-fraud measures taken and assess alterations as they are made. 
The Commission's thoughts on these findings,  at this stage of the study, can be broken 
down into three strands. 
A.  To make it easier to plan measures and tailor them as closely as possible to the 
situation on the ground, a greater amount of more detailed information is required and 
we need better statistics on the results of  anti-fraud measures at every stage from controls 
to recovery  and ordering of penalties.  This will  make  it easier to  assess  the  level of 
assimilation of the Community's  f~ial  interests with the nations'  and this,  in turn, 
.  I 
should prompt the national authorities to make the necessary adjustments.  To improve  .. 
the quality of the  analysis even further'  we  need  information which wUl enable us to 
compare recovery rates for the various types of tax revenue, the number of out-of-court 
63 settlements and the amounts involved, the numbet" of  controls and in-depth investigations 
relating to national finances on the one hand and Community finances on the other. 
B.  In certain areas the only way of  making improvements is to alter national practices 
to make them more similar at Community level. This goes for controls (comparable level 
of monitoring throughout the Community), recovery rules (time-limits, interruption of 
time-limits, interest on late p~yments, recovery through offsetting etc.), privil~ges  granted 
to the national treasuries in respect of Community debts, administrative penalties and 
rules governing their imposition.  The Commission agrees with the  view expressed in 
some  of the  national  reports  that  the  Community  must provide  a  strong  and  steady . 
' 
impetus if the above improvements are to be made and incorporated into the regulatory . · 
'  ' 
framework. 
C.  The  national  reports  reveal  a  desire  for  simpler,  more  effective  rules.  The 
Commission feels e.xactly the same way. A maze of  excessively complex regulations just 
'  .  ' 
makes  it harder to .root· out fraud.  They  actually  provide  less  protection for  honest 
traders, who can be lead into errors and omissions by them. The measures taken by·the 
Commission to improve the quality of financial management are largely geared towards 
dealing with these problems: And the Commission has made better management of the 
Community's finances  11 ·  p~iority. Some  ~ember  ·States  mentioned the  desirability of 
regular national audits to assess national control systems. This idea could provide a good 
foundation for decisive progress on the road to simpler and more effective instruments. 
1.3.  Action to follow  up the Court of Auditors' reports 
The European Council meetiogs in Essen and Cannes called on the Member States and 
the Community institutions never to let up iri the fight against fraud and the comparative 
study of the action taken in response to the reports from the Court of Auditors (referred 
to  in the  Essen conclusions) seemed  to  be a useful complement to  the  Commission's 
work. 
The third sub-section gave the Member States an opportunity to inform the Commission 
~ 
of its reactions to the Court of Auditors' reports and the follow-up measures taken. It was 
felt that, in addition to the Council's regular analyses of the Court's annual and special 
64 reports, it would be useful to assess the action taken by the Member States in response 
to  the  Court's  comments  relating  directly  to  them.  Clearly,  the  comments  of an 
experienced outside audit are to be welcomed as a way of filling any gaps in the control 
system. 
The  sheer scale  of the  exercise  probably  explains  why  the  results  were  somewhat 
disappointing. Leaving aside the three new Member States which joined in 1995 and to 
which this section did not apply, four Member States either omit to deal with the matter 
entirely or give only general replies (on the  follow-up  measures or the national  au~it 
body). Not enough information is given for a comparative table. 
Some of the Court's comments are criticized for being irrelevant or are played down. 
The German report criticizes the timing of an inquiry into the Guarantee Section of the 
EAGGF, which coincided with a  general  reorganization of the  agricultural payment 
agencies. The Belgian authorities are unhappy because the prelimj.nary reports were not 
sent out or were sent out too late. Most of the reports make do· with general comments 
to the effect that appropriate follow-up measures have been taken, or cite a few carefully 
chosen examples to show how zealously they are implementing the Court of Auditors' 
recommendations. 
The UK report is exceptional in answering all 35 of the criticisms made in the Court's 
annual  reports  for  1992 and  1993  and  the  five  special  reports.  Some of the  Court's 
findings are challenged but, apart from a few inevitable differences of opinion, the UK 
has clearly heeded the Court's comments and, where necessary, taken appropriate action 
(for example,  it has made changes to the  systems of ESF controls and improved the 
methods of identifying beef and veal and agricultural control techniques). 
Some other reports also contain interesting information, albeit less systematically. Ireland 
reports on the measures it had taken to make controls on customs entries more effective 
and to tighten up post-clearance document controls. It has also simplified procedures for 
goods in free circulation (in response to the  1992 and 1993 reports). Denmark has also 
made changes to its system of post-clearance controls on imports and exports, raising the 
number of inspection visits and introducing new methods to show up high-risk cases (as 
requested by  the  Court in  1994).  The  Netherlands  were also asked to improve their 
65 method of establishing import duties and,  following  Ute  comments made in 1992 and 
1993, drew up instructions for more detailed customs inquiries. Spain reports that it has 
developed new tools (particular date-:processing tools) to help it monitor Structural Funds 
audited by the Court  . 
. 
Avenues to be explored (1.3.) 
The Essen conclusions require the institutions and the Member States to do their best to 
act on the recommendations of the Court of Auditors, which constitute a very valuable 
tool in the drive to improve financial management. 
The measures taken to achieve this objective could be assessed as part of the national 
audits carried out periodically to monitor the reliability of national controls. Some of  the 
Member States which already do this have suggested that the others should join them. 
Some  of the  guidelines  the  Commission  intends  to  draw up  to  tighten up fmancial 
management in cooperation with the  Member  State~, could be  included  in the same 
framework. 
66 Part II: Application of second paragraph of Article 209a of tbe EC Treaty 
(cooperation) 
The second paragraph of Article 209a of the  EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty on 
European Union reads as follows: 
'Without prejudice to other provisions of this  Treaty,  Member States shall coordillllte. 
their action aiTMd at protecting the financial interests of  the Comn&IUiity against fraud. 
To  this  end they  shall organize.  with  the  help of the  Commission,  close and regul/Jr 
cooperation between the competent departments of  their administrations.' 
In addition to requiring the Member States to take the same measures to counter fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting 
their own financial  interests  (see  the  first  paragraph of Article 209a)  the  EC  Treaty 
contains this provision aimed at bringing about close and  regu~ar  ~ooperation, with the 
help of the Commission. 
This provision is particularly aimed at international fraud. Financial crime is increasingly 
an organized activity and one of the targets is the Community budget, which cannot be 
defended  by  the  individual  Member  States  acting  alone.  Better  and  more  regular 
cooperation is needed if the Community's interests are to be properly protected. 
The  second paragraph of Article 209a  is  confirmation that the  fight  against fraud  is 
primarily  the  Member  States'  responsibility.  To  carry  out  this  task,  they  need  to 
cooperate more as partners, with the Commission's help.  It was with this in mind that 
the Commission set up the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention 
(COCOLAF)  to  organize  cooperation  between  the  relevant  departments  - a  move 
welcomed by the Council (Economic and Financial Affairs) on 11 July  1994. 
The Commission asked the Member States to comment on three types of  cooperation; the 
first two arranged by the Member States on a non-Community footing, i.e. administrative 
cooperation (2.1.1) and cooperation in criminal matters (2.1.2), and the third based on 
Community instruments (2.1.3). 
67 2.1.1. Administrative cooperation and assistance under non-Community instruments 
All the reports quote non-Community cooperation 'instruments. The table below gives a 
summary of  the various cooperation activities mentioned in the national reports, dividing 
them into the five general categories suggested by the Commission. 
Administrative cooperation and assistance under non-Community instruments 
InventQry of  AssessmeQt of  Problems  suggestions/reasons 
cooperation measures  results (b)  encountered (c)  for placing on 
(and legal bases) (a)  Community footing 
B  Naples Convention  1993 and  1994: 
requests received: 
1797 
transmitted:  1010 
DK  Reference to 
administrative 
cooperation on fraud 
affecting the 
Structural Funds 
Council of Europe 
Conventions 
D  12 bilateral  1993:  Time  talcen  Personal contact 
agreements (3  new  requests received:  sometimes  useful 
MSs(•), 9 non- 1912  excessive,  Conclusion of 
member countries  transmitted: 299  insufficient  MA(•) agreements 
(detailed breakdown  justification for  d~facto 
Naples Convention  by country).  Results  requests and number  Gradually transfer 
generally positive  of requests  to Community 
EL  Examples of good  Difficulties with 
cooperation  some countries 
(Lebanon, Cyprus)  (Kuwait,  Bulgaria) 
E  Contacts on basis of  19 instances of  Problem with 
national instruments  cooperation  authenticity of 
Role of General Audit  (Poland, Argentina)  documents from 
Office of State  non-member 
Administration  countries 
F  Customs cooperation  Increase in  Powers of customs  More exchanges 
with MSs (83%) and  cooperation:  16%  officials differ  for officials and 
non-member countries  offences detected  between countries  more vigorous 
(17%)  following  approach to 
information  implementation of 
exchange  agricultural MA 
IRL  Naples Convention  1992 and  1993:  Support for 
requests received:  conclusion of MA 
CCC recommendation  16  agreements by 
transmitted:  12  Community 
No specific bilateral  (non-member 
agreements  countries) 
68 I  Naples Convention  ~31 instances of  Occasional failure to  More spontaneous 
cooperation with  respond to requests  cooperation 
Bilateral agreements.  non-member  Evidential value of 
(Member States and  countries  documents received  Support for 
non-member  conclusion of MA 
countries)  agreementS by. 
Community 
Informal cooperation 
L  Naples Convention 
Benelux Convention 
1959 Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 
Schengen agreements 
NL  Naples Convention  1992-93  Present situation 
Benelux Convention  requests  received:  satisfactory.  No 
Bilateral agreements  502  suggestions.  No 
(Scandinavian  transmitted:  192  reason to put on 
countries)  (detailed breakdown  Community footing 
CCC recommendation  by country) 
. 
p  CCC recommendation  1993 and  1994  No problems to  No reason to put 
Bilateral agreements  requests received:  report  .  on Community 
with Morocco  15  footing,  unless 
transmitted:  14  problems arise in 
direct contacts 
between MSs and 
I  non-member 
countries 
0  Bilateral agreements  Support for 
with non-member  conclusion of MA 
countries (US,  agreements by 
countries of central  Community 
and eastern Europe)  Need to involve 




su  17 bilateral  Cooperation 
agreements (MSs and  projects with 
non-member  countries of ceQ.tral 
countries)  and eastern Europe 
CCC recommendation  (VAT) 
Nairobi Convention 
sv  Bilateral agreements  Support for 
with MSs and non- conclusion of MA 
member countries  agreements by 
Community 
UK  Naples Convention ·  No record of MA  MA arrangements 
CCC recommendation  requests  '  essential in fight 
agaiDSt fraud 
(•) MS:  Member State;  MA:  mutual assistance 
69 With the exception of the Austrian and French reports, which did not deal with the three 
types of cooperation separately, and  the  Danish report,  which covered administrative 
cooperation on fraud affecting the Structural Funds only, the reports provided sufficient 
information on non-Community administrative cooperation. 
A number of reports gave figures - sometimes very detailed - on requests for inquiries 
into offences. While it was hard to draw any comparison between these figures, they at 
least  show  that  the  cooperation  mechanisms  are  used.  Information  is  exchanged 
frequently. The importance of spontaneous and personal contact with the relevant people 
and agencies in other countries is often highlighted, especially in the Belgian, German . 
'  and  Portuguese reports. Such contacts are facilitated  by databases (Belgium),  training . · 
(Portugal) and a mutual-assistance information centre set up by the Member States .(UK). 
The cooperation dealt with in this section (2.1.1) relates primarily to customs matters-
the Naples Convent~on'fo~  cooperation between the Member States and recommendations 
.  . 
of  the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC) and bilateral customs cooperation agreements 
for cooperation with non-member countries. 
However, the requests for information do not all relate to own resources. Some of them 
concern  other  areas  of the  Community's ·activities.· The  Benelux  countries  have  a  .  .  . 
cooperation agreement providing for administrative assistance on matters going beyond 
customs cooperation. 
The attention devoted to cooperation with non-member countries varies from one report 
to another.  In most cases it is  based on bilateral agreements and is  more common in 
some  Member States,  such as· Germany,  than  others.  Strictly  speaking,  the  second 
paragraph of Article 209a does not require cooperation with non-member countries, only 
cooperation between the Member States. But this form of cooperation does help achieve 
assimilation where there are similar bilateral agreements to protect the Member States' 
national interests. Agreements with non-member countries also help to achieve a standard 
level of protection at the Community's external borders. 
The Member States have adopted no new cooperation instruments since the Union Treaty 
entered into force, but have continued to use existing instruments. Many Member States 
70 mentio~  the 1967 Naples Conve'ntion, which is part of the acquis communautaire which 
all Mell)ber States must accept. Sometimes figures are given too. The Naples Convention 
contains provisions covering areas outside the Community's jurisdiction, similar to those 
found in ~julation  (EEC) No  1468/81 on mutualassistance (see point 2.1.3 below). The 
fact that the Convention is mentioned in the reports suggests that the two instruments are 
sometimes  used  simultaneously  for  a  single  exchange  of information  or  that  the 
Convention is  invoked instead of the Community regulation. 
Avenues to be explored (2.1.1.) 
·~reports  reveal how important cooperation instruments are for the Member States. On 
the basis of the information in the  reports, we  have  formulated some ideas as to what 
action needs to be taken at Community level and what can be done to make cooperation 
mechanisms more effective. 
A.  A nwnber of reports acknowledge the  need to  increase the level of cooperation 
between the Member States. A more structured approach is required where structures do 
\ 
not yet exist. The existing regulatory framework for cooperation must be extended in 
order to achieve the lev~l of  cooperation required by Article 209a. Perhaps there is scope 
for a common approach to solving the various problems mentioned in connection with 
.the mutual assistance mechanisms (e.g. time taken to reply and insufficient justification 
for requests). 
B.  Closer  operational  links  inust  be  developed  between  the  various  departments 
responsible for prosecuting the perpetrators of serious and complex fraud (part of the 
phenomenon  of  large-scale  organized  financial  crime).  The  links  between  these 
departments,  combating  international  fraud,  and  the  Commission  also  need  to  be 
strengthened in certain areas where the existing framework is inadequate. For example, 
new procedures must be devised to enable the Commission to develop the support which 
it can give these departments in carrying out their duties. 
C.  Building up personal contacts and increasing the number of  exchanges for officials 
and liaison officers are also good ways of  strengthening cooperation between the Member 
States. The effectiveness of cooperation depends not only on the instruments providing 
71 for contacts between experts (with the  long-term  in  mind},  but also on the quality of 
relations between investigators and other officials. 
D.  Some consideration must be given to the question raised by a number of Member 
States as to whether the Commission should continue or indeed step up work leading up 
to the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with non-member countries. 
2.1.2.  Cooperation in criminal matters 
The  second  paragraph  of  Article  209a  is  not  confmed  to  purely  administrative 
cooperation. It requires the Member States to engage in wider-ranging cooperation where 
that is necessary to counter fraud against Community revenue and expenditure, especially 
where transnational organized crime is  involved. 
Organized  financial  crime  cannot  be  allowed  to  exploit divergences  in enforcement 
facilities as a means of  securing impunity for itself. The need for deep-seated, effective, 
direct and rapid cooperation is clearly revealed by the analysis of the national reports, 
even if it is not always explicitly stated as such. 
To gain an overview of the reality here, the question of police and judicial coordination 
was to be considered in terms of the following topics: legal basis (conventions, bilateral 
agreements,  exchanges  of letters,  informal  approaches);  description  of procedure, 
channels and time factor;  inventory of the number of police cooperation cases relating 
to fraud in the two reference years; results, evaluation, difficulties encountered, limits 
to this type of cooperation and suggested improvements. 
Few of tile reports deal with these topics exhaustively. The information they yield is set 
out in summary form in the table below. 
Cooperation in criminal matters 
Mem  (a) Police  (b) Judicial  (c) Difficulties  (d) Suggestions 
ber  cooperation  cooperation  encountered 
State 
B  Cooperation with  Item not covered;  reference to Third Pillar 
UCLAF mentioned 
72 OK  ExiltinJ qreementl liltCd 
D  Existing ~menta  (Schengen) 
·BL  Extradition and judicial cooperation  Third pillar 
qrcementa  mentioned 
E  Bilateral contacts 
F  Cf. Table 2.1.1 
IRL  Not covered 
I  - Conventions and Treaties listed  Funber work within 
- Reference to informal cooperation via UCLAF  c.uncu (Third 
pillar) desired 
L  Ad hoc cooperation  Existing aareements  Neutral remark 
UDder Schengen  listed  about further work 
1  within COUDCU 
- (Third pillar) 
NL  3S requests for  - Occasional bold-ups u  between 
judicial cooperation  administrative aDd criminal approacbes (ref 
(customs) received  to Third pillar) 
- Delays with letters roptory 
p  Not covered 
Os  Cf. Table 2.1.1 
.· . 
.o9; 
su  Cf. l'able 2.1.1  -Existing 
National  agreements listed 
Investigation Bureau  -Specific  . 




detailed de!Cription  . 
given  . 
sv  Police cooperation  -Existing  Legislation on 
needs no specific  agreements listed  judicial coopera\ion 
basis; is based on  (with national  is pending 
leplation of  transposal 
COUDti'y concerned  legislation) 
- Foreip Ministry 
centralizes 
• 
73 UK  - Cooperation based on European  Delays; retusar of  1.  Registers of 
Convention on judicial cooperation in  certain Member  companies and 
criminal qtatters 1959 (Protocol of 1978)  States to extradite  firms 
- Interpol Central Bureau (in the  National  their own nationals  2.  Stronger 
Criminal Intelligence Service) coordinates  procedures for 
- European Extradition Convention signed  cooperation 
between central  .  authorities 







It can be seen that  there  is  little  difference  between police  cooperation and judicial 
' 
cooperation. Existing legal bases apply specifically to judicial cooperation whereas police 
cooperation  is  handled  either  on  an  ad  hoc  informal  basis  or  under  the  judicial 
cooperation arrangements. There can be hold-ups at both levels, as  is clear from the 
report on the Netherlands, where there is both an administrative approach and a criminal 
law approach to enforcement coordination. 
Several national reports highlight the value of  administrative cooperation beginning at the 
initial investigation stage so that information can be exchanged on an institutionalized 
basis between Member States and between them and the Commission. Such is the case 
of the Belgian OCDEFO, which is  empowered to  maintain contacts with counterpart 
services in other Member States and the Commission. Greece supports the establishment 
of investigative and enforcement agencies maintaining contacts with each other and with 
the Commission. Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom take a similar view. 
However,  none  of the  reports  looks  at  the  relationship  between  fraud  against  the 
Community budget and police cooperation in any precise fashion. Apart from figures as 
to the number of requests for investigation received by  the Dutch customs, no data on 
cooperation on the enforcement side are given. 
The United Kingdom is the only Member State to offer practical suggestions for stronger 
c~peration in enforcement, such as the possibility of conferring comparable powers on 
national  investigators  (this  idea  is  shared by  France),  developing  new  tools  such as 
74 information files  and meetings  between relevant services, giving  priority  to criminal 
investigations and easing access to bank data. 
Most reports· deal  with the  question by  listing existing  instruments,  which commonly 
include the European Extradition Convention 1959 (and the additiorial protocols of 1975 
and 1978), the European Convention on judicial cooperation in criminal matters 1959 
(and the additional protocol of 1978) and  the Schengen Agreement of 1990. Only two 
reports mention Third pillar cooperation in the Council. 
The conclusion must be that on the enforcement side most Member States have not been 
at pains to show that they are willing to give priority to the duty to cooperate of their 
own motion.  The Commission will  have  to pursue  its  work in order to  provide  the 
Member States with the assistance required by the  s~cond paragraph of Article 209a in 
developing the  tools  needed  for  effective  cooperation in the  fight  against fraud.  The 
Ecofm Council on 11  July 1994 confirmed the Commission's role in operational action 
and in coordinating  investigatio~. notably  in areas that are particularly vulnerable to 
transnational fraud. 
Avenues to be explored (2.1.2.) 
The  information  to  hand  reveals  the  vital  importance  of equipping  the  national 
.  .  . 
enforcement authorities with efficient means of meeting the need for a high and uniform 
level of protection for the Community's finances. 
A.  To improve cooperation between national authorities and between them and the 
Commission, there is  a need to develop. facilities for exchanging information between 
national enforcement authorities and the relevant Commission departments at the initial 
investigation stage. The Commission will accordingly pursue its work of looking into the 
possibilities and bringing about a legal instrument to extend cooperation to the full range 
of pre-litigation activities.  • 
B.  It would be worth pursuing the  in~estigation of the means and powers available to 
fraud investigators so as to consider at a later stage the possibility suggeste~ by some of 
the national reports of conferring comparable powers on all national investigators. 
75 C.  To ensure that all findings  from  action undertaken by  the  Community with the 
Member States are used to full effect, notably in the event of  criminal proceedings, it will 
also be necessary to  review the Commission's role and its activities in relation to the 
national authorities and to see what action must be taken in terms of adjustments to the 
arsenal of legal instruments. 
D.  As for the criminal law itself, the measures needed to transpose the Convention on 
the protection by the criminal law of the Community's financial interests must be taken 
as  quickly  as  possible.  This  first  step  on  the  road  will  be  fully  effective  only  if 
accompanied by  enhanced judicial cooperation operating direct at Community  level, 
targeted on the protection of the Community's financial interests and based on networks 
of courts  and  prosecutors.  The  implementation  of such  networks  will  facilitate  the 
application of the principle enshrined in the Convention of centralizing proceedings at a 
single court. 
2.1.3.  Administrative  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  under  Community 
instruments 
A number of  Community regulations impose a cooperation obligation on Member States. 
They are: 
- in the field of own resources, Regulations 1468/81 and 218/92 (VAT); 
- in the agricultural field,  Regulations 4045/89 and 595/91; 
- for Structural Funds, Regulations 1681/94 and  1831/94. 
Specific provisions in these regulations require individual Member States to assist each 
other.  acting  on their  own  initiative  and  without  the  Commission  necessarily  being 
involved.  Member States must,  for  instance, exchange any facts  in their possession. 
Such exchanges cover matters such as the findings of inspections in multinational ftmls, 
information about specific operations or suspected or established cases of fraud where. 
to quote the regulations applying to agriculture and structural operations, "it is feared that 
they may very quickly have repercussions outside its territory". 
76 As the _regulations  are directly applicable in the Member States, fairly comprehensive 
coverage  of this  aspect  could  ~ve been  expected  in  the  national  reports  (with  the 
exception·of the three new Member States, which as yet have no practical experience in 
the matter):  Three Member States, however, mention none of the regulations and five 
of them omit at least three ·of the seven cited by the Commission.  Some Member States 
also mention others;  Denmark and the Netherlands quite rightly refer to the difficulties 
in cooperation on recovery (Directive 76/308).  .  . 
However,  some  reports contain sufficient  information for  a comparative analysis  as 
summa~d  in the following table. 
Administrative cooperation and m»tual assistance under Community instruments 
Member  Inventory of bilateral or  Results and evaluation of  Any suggestions for 
State  multilateral cooperation  these cooperation activities;  improvements to this type 
activities  identification of practical  of cooperation 
difficulties 
B  1468/81:  1993:  122  Results of cooperation  Maintenance and 
mutual assistance messages  dependent on personal  intensification of contacts 
received;  1994:  114  contacts between Member  between officials 
received  States' officials  Development of data bases 
4045/89:  1993: 4 requests 
received and 3 sent;  1994: 
6 received and  .S  sent  · 
DK  1468/81:  1993:  114  No reply in some cases,  Legal basis satisfactory, 
mutual assistance requests  which can be an obstacle to  but faster and more 
received, 4 sent;  1994:  6.5  court proceedings  elaborate information 
requests received,  23 sent  exchange system desirable. 
218/92:  Tax cooperation  Improvements required in 
the field of recovery 
(Directive 76/308) 
D  Requests based both on  Difficulties in _taking part  Impose time limits for 
Regulation 14181/81  and on  in the inspections of other  replies in the regulations 
the. Naples Convention.  Member States (problem of 
No separate statistics; total  foreign inspectors) 
1993: 4 316 received,  Problem with time taken 
'  4•668 sent  for replies 
4045/89: 8 requests sent in 
1993, 44 in 1994 
EL  No data  Cooperation with  Closer cooperation with 
Commission departments  the Commission 
and national authorities is  On-going training and 
improving  exchanges of officials 
77 E  1468/81:  1993: 62 mutual  Cooperation and mutual  Cooperation to be 
assistance requests  assistance very positive  extended 
received, 22 sent;  1994:  Problem of availability of 
59 received, 68 sent  information required for 
judicial proceedings 
F  No data  Checks on products in free  Generalisation of 
circulation, the resulls of  cross-checks 
which are sent to the 
Member States concerned 
IRL  1468/81 (SCENT)  Use of the Scent network 
1992:  167  mutual  to inform the Commission 
assistance requests  of the findings of 
received,  182 sent;  1993:  enquiries. Smooth 
90 received and 162 sent _  operation, good spirit of 
cooperation 
I  1468/81:  1 004 cases  Positive trends: cooperation  Cooperation activities to 
218/92: 21  resulting in the  be  brought to the notice of 
identification of fraud or  UCLAF (possibly via 
attempted fraud against the  Scent) 
Community budget 
L  Instruments mentioned: 
1468/81 (customs) 
218/92 (indirect taxation) 
N  1468/81:  1992:  requests  Establishment of fraud or  Mutual assistance reports 
received: 81;  1993: 256  irregularities in certain  should be reserved for 
1992/93: 75 items of  cases. Because of their  complex fraud cases 
information supplied to  number and content mutual 
other Member States  assistance messages could 
Directive 76/308 on  not be handled with 
recovery  sufficient attention. 
Recovery: no emergency 
measures to guarantee 
recovery; no simultaneous 
recovery measures in 
~ 
different Member States 
OS  Instruments mentioned: 
1468/81, bilateral 
agreements with a number 
of Member States 
p  1468/81:  1993: 88  Difficulties in obtaining  Harmonization of the areas 
requests received (  44  information involving  covered by the various 
requests satisfied)  personal data  authorities in order to 
30 requests sent  facilitate cooperation 
1994:  137 requests 
received (112 requests 
satisfied) 
28 requests made 
4045/89:  1994:  8 requests 
received,  11  sent 
su  Practical difficulties:  Harmonization norms in 
language problems, time  the field of risk assessment 
lag and differences in 
computerized systems 
78 SV  Instrument applicable;: 
1468/81  (customs) 
UK  1468/81  No compulsory  Installation in each 
77 requests for  transmission of fmdings  Member State of national 
information handled;  138  Dual customs and VAT  ~lUge~  and ~h 
requests concerning own•  agency involvement  centre for commercial 
resources (outside CAP)  Lack of common entry  fraud 
processing systems across  Notification by 
·community  Commission.of specific. 
Time taken to respond to  cases and legal  decilio~ 
mutual alsistance requests  on current issues 
Differences in legislation  Requeit for regular 
Community·wide  meetings with other 




The Community cooperation instruments are clearly not ignored and Member States find 
this type of cooperation satisfactory. 
The main difficulties  mentioned  concern the  response  times,  which can slow  down 
investigations and judicial proceedings, and differences of  all kinds (administrative, legal, 
technical) which hamper the movement of information'  between Member States. 
It is also noted that the mutual information arrangements under Regulations S9SI91  in 
agriculture and 1681194 for the Structural Funds are hardly ever mentioned, which could 
indicate that nq real use is  being made of them. 
' 
A fairly substantial number of suggestions are made to improve this type of cooperation 
and demonstrate the interest that Member States have in it.  They are summarized in the 
right-hand  column of the  table  above  and  taken up  in  part in the  "avenues !o be 
explored".  The relevant sections of the national reports show that new requirem~nts are 
emerging in the Member States for combating fraud,  in particular a basic requirement 
for rapid information on transnational fraud.  It was stressed that fraud rarely developed 
in isolation in a  ~ingle country.  The Commission is required by the second paragraph~ 
of Article 209a to provide its aid.  It must therefore be placed in a position to niake dse 
of the potential of the existing cooperation tools·· or to adapt tllettt to this requirement. 
The Council (Ecofin) of 11  July  1994 called on the Commission to step up its operation&l 
role  and  its  role  of coordinator  of Member  States'  investigations,  in particular  for 
79 transnational operations.  It also called for greater cooporation with the organization of 
suitable  procedures  between  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  to  enab~e the 
Commission to provide assistance in the field of recovery. 
Avenues to be explored (2.1.3.) 
The panoply of instruments available at Community level has not been neglected by the 
Member States, even though it would appear that the potential of  this cooperation has not 
been  used  to  the  full.  Given  the  key  role  of cooperation,  recognized  by  all  the 
Member States, the objective must be to develop existing mechanisms to make them more. 
'  efficient and so increase the use made of them. 
A.  The information systems must develop  and be  adapted  to reflect the reality of 
certain constraints such as the level of priority, the presentation of information and the 
assessment of risk ..  The.cooperation forums provided for in the operating rules for all  .  . 
these  instruments· m,.Ist  consider  these  matters  quickly  in order  to  produce  a  clear  .  .. 
definition of requirements and  introduce appropriate rules  (redrafting of instrumeD.ts, 
... 
production of  guides to procedures, access to reports, cooperation methods, and creation 
of files at central level). 
B.  Certain forms:' of  cot>peration spotlighted in the national reports need to be explored 
and developed, an example being the organization of action to be taken on cross-checks 
on goods in free circulation.  Regular meetings between the relevant departments must 
be encouraged, as must the rapid organization of ad hoe contacts on urgent and serious 
cases.  Thought should be given at Community level to the development of d8tabases 
,. 
containing information about economic operators (risk criteria) recommended by certain 
Member States  which  already ·have  a central  register  (or which suggest that one  be 
created). 
C.  Mutual assistance in recovery must be made more effective.  The directive relating 
to these mechanisms must be adapted to  the  needs of the  single market by giving the 
Member State, which has exclusive responsibility for recovery, the legal resources and 
the information required to perform its task.  Better use must be made of the potential 
for mutual assistance in agricultural, customs or own resources matters by systematically 
80 associating the Commission whenever a Community interest is involved, as is the case 
in recovery matters.  This interest may not, in fact, be immediately apparent when a case 
arises  revealing  the  organization  of a  fraud  sy~tem which  must  be  prevented  from 
spreading to other areas of the Union. 
D.  Generally speaking, the Community regulations on cooperation must be applied 
properly  and  fully  throughout  the  Community.  The  Advisory  Committee  for  the 
Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) must meet regularly in its  specialized 
formations to evalute results, develop the full potential of the system and if necessary lay 
down rules for the presentation and degree of detail of institutional coopet:adon in order 
to  secure  uniform  data.  The  full  committee  will  then  recommend  the  necessary 
adjustments,  will  provide  the  necessary  impetus  and  will  ~ubmit any  conclusions  it 
reaches to the appropriate authorities. 
81 Part DI:  Equivalence between. measures to protect national finances and those to 
proted the Community's rmanclal interests 
Me~ber  States were asked to ascertain, by a comparative analysis of  the controls applied  .  . 
and the administrative and judicial measures taken in the event of irregularities, whether 
' 
the measures to protect the Community's financial  interests were in fact equivalent to 
those taken· to protect national finances. 
.  . 
Inevitably, such an exercise quickly encounters serious methodological problems. On the 
one hand, it cannot be based exclusively on quantitative data, the accuracy of  which can 
hardly be ~teed  in any case. On the other hand, a clear distinction cannot always 
be made betw~n  the protection of national and Community interests. 
It would be presumptuous, however, and might even be tantamount to questioning the 
validity of the European Council's original request, if one were totally to neglect this 
aspect of  the report or simply to claim that equivalence is guaranteed by definition, since 
Community funds are channelled through national accounts and thus become national 
funds, or to claim that equivalellCe has always been guaranteed or eyen that Community 
funds receive better protection and indeed enjoyed such protection even before the Treaty 
on European Union came ,into force . 
. Most of the reports in fact make no attempt to demonstrate that equivalence has been 
achieved. As can be seen from the following table, little or no precise iliformation has 
been provided on the staff allocated to control duties or on the administrative and judicial 
action taken in response to irregularities. 
Equivalence between the' protection of national and Community fiDIIDCial  interests 
Member  3  .I. Controls/measures  3.2. Administrative follow-up  3.3. Judicial 
State  follow-up 
B  Powers of the Belgian Court of A'Uditors  No meaningful information 
aligned on those of the European Court 
of Audirors 
-
DK  No details given  Problem of  recording 
court decisions on 
frauds aaainst the 
Community bucf&et 
82 D  - increase in  staff (20% in  6 years) and  No details given 
resources available for control. 
purposes 
EL  No details given 
-
E  No meaning~! information 
F  No details given (number of staff allocated to agricultural controls: see 1.1.2) 
IRL  EAGGF Guarantee: 90 full-time fraud  No meaningful information 
prevention officials. 
More controls than for national revenue  . 
(tobacco, beer). 
Same number of officials (500) 
responsible for traditional own resources. 
as for national resources (500), although 
the latter are 7 times greater 
I  No meaningful information 
L  No details given 
N  Evidence to show that such an exercise is impossible and pointless. 
p  Not discussed (conclusion: 
point 3) 
OS  5 800 customs officials  Not discussed. 
su  EAGGF Guarantee: EEC controls (5%)  Not discussed. 
-more intensive than national controls 
(1%) 
sv  No meaningful information 
UK  HM Customs and Excise (traditional  No meaningful i.nformation. 
own resources): 21  man/years assigned 
to investigation duties and 59.5  to 
control duties (1993/94) 
Most of the reports thus repeat the answers given earlier, but this time in the fonn of 
conclusions to demonstrate that the country concerned complies with the "assimilation" 
principle. The Irish report is the exception here, since it provides a comparative analysis 
of the staff assigned to control duties (point 3.1 ).  . 
Since no comparative figures are given for fraud  against the national and Community 
budgets, it is difficult to comment on the true degree of assimilation within the Union. 
At most, the reports provide some clues to the real situation. An analysis of  the existing 
arrangements (legislation, organization) indicates that revenue  is better protected than 
expenditure and that agricultural expenditure is more closely supervised than expenditure 
on structural measures. As a rule, the Member States simply assert that assimilation has 
been achieved, although the degree of assimilation in this or that sector is not specified 
or borne out by a comparison of results. Besides, in most cases there are no comparable 
results by which the degree of assimilation could be accurately measured. 
83 A number of factors tend to blur the meaning of "assimilation". It is often claimed that 
the Community's  legislation on controls  in the  agricultural  sector is  so detailed that 
Community expenditure is more closely monitored than national expenditure (and in some 
cases this has been shown to be true). It is also frequently claimed that the proper use of 
risk analysis can achieve more than an increase in the number of  inspectors; theoretically 
'  . 
this should apply irrespective of the nature (Community or national) of the resourc:es or 
expenditure concerned. 
These  are  valid  suggestions, . but  one  must  not  lose  sight of the  fact  that  efficient 
protection  presupposes  both  adequa~ levels  of controls  and  the  prosecution of any 
infringements discovered. This point, which was made in the Yugoslav  maize case,  is 
essential to any assessment of how far Member States are prepared to go to ensure full 
assimilation. 
What is the point of expanding departments and developing control procedures, in full 
compliance with the assimilation principle, if  this is followed at the recovery and penalty 
stages  by  the  tacit  acceptance  of differences  in  treatment?  One  wonders  how  far 
assimilation has actually  progressed when  Member  States  react  to  fraudulent  import 
transactions  by  implementing the  VAT recovery  procedures  without  any thought for 
traditional own resources. 
Compliance with Article 209a means that national behaviour has .to take account of the 
need to protect  the  Community's  fmancial  interests  and  that  full  equivalence,  which 
Member States often claim to have achieved, must in fact be gradually brought about by 
specific  measures  which  should  be  subject  to  continuous  assessment,  so  that  the 
improvement in the management of Community finances goes hand in hand with better 
protection of its financial interests. 
• 
•  • 
Although the national reports do not always lend themselves to a detailed and exhaustive 
comparative  analysis  and  although they do not  always  indicate  that  the  assimilation 
principle is being observed in all areas of national life, they do suggest avenues to be 
explored and ways in which progress could be achieved. Moreover, the points made in 
one report are often similar or identical with those made in anoth~r. 
Most of the reports reach the conclusion that progress needs to be made on all fronts, 
with cooperation at all stages from prevention to prosecution. 
84 In  many  cases  the  reports  recommend  that  priority  should  be  given  to  action  at 
Gommunity  level  so  that  in·  certain  areas  the  ~onitoring  arrangements  could  be 
strengthened on the basis .of objective criteria, with a view to harnionizing the  ~ontrols 
carried out by Member States. 
Similarly, some Member States recommend the systematic and regular evaluation of  these · 
arrangements so that constant adjustments can be made to the level of  protection afforded 
to Community finances, thus making for optimum national and Community. supervision  .  . 
and  re~ecting the  needs  of the  moment  and  the  real  risks  "involved.  One  freqpent 
suggestion is'for the introduction of auditing structures combining all levels of expertise. 
Ongoing simplification of  the rules is often said to be essential if the legislation is to be· 
consistent and take account of the cost-effectiveness aspects. 
Numerous  virtues  are  ascribed  to  cooperation,  which  is  in  many  cases  seen  as  the 
necessary catalyst for effective national and Community action to counter sophisticated 
transnational  fraud  and organized financial  crime.  All  seem to  agree on the need  for 
greater cooperation so that more effective work is done in the field and the intelligence 
available  is  fully  utilized.  This  might  entail  improvements to  existing  procedures or 
institutional cooperation which went beyond mere administrative assistance. 
/ 
Some take the view that the optimum arrangement would be for the Community itself to 
apply a mandatory system of set administrative penalties and for appropriate measures 
to be taken to improve the compatibility and equivalence of  national systems of  criminal 
law. 
Be this as it maf, the Community  is currently  endeavouring to achieve the necessary 
convergence between the economies of its Member States so that it can enter into the 
decisive phase of  economic and monetary union and is currently stepping up the volume 
of financial assistance for such integration.  In this context it would be surprising if  fum 
declarations of intent were made at the  highest levels but the necessary steps were not 
then take~ to translate these declarations into specific improvements in the protection of 
the Community's financial interests. 
Improvements in fraud prevention require not just "assimilation" but also a voluntarist 
policy of stronger preventive measures so  that all Member States apply more effective 
and  equivalent  controls.  Improvements  will  also  require  the  application  of stricter 
penalties  within  the  institutional  framework  of the  Union.  It  is  obviously  a  basic 
principle of the management of public  finances  that those collecting or administering 
Community  funds  have  an  obligation  to  ensure  surveillance  and  financial  control. 
Fulfilment of this obligation must, however, go hand in hand with the adoption of clear 
85 and  biridi:f~g rules  and criteria for each sector, to provide a more .solid foundation  for 
surveillance work and to achieve equivalent levels of  cohtrol throughout the Community. 
Nor is  it sufficient to  hive greater compatibility  i~ the -types  of fraUdulent  activity or 
behaviour which one  hopes to combat It is ·also  necessary  to  harmonize enforcement 
action to counter fraudsters who move from one Member State to another in order to take 
advantage of less stringent laws.  In  1989 the Court of Justice held that penalties must 
be made "effective, proportionate and dissuasive", and this remains the objective which 
must be achieved homogeneously throughout the Union if we are to halt the expansion 
of  organized and transnational firiancial crime, the exponents of  which carry out their own 
risk analysis. 
The property of  the European taxpayers must be protected if  the institutions and Member  · 
States of the  Unio~. are to maintain their credibility.  The Community, which has taken 
steps to improve its financial management, must logically iake even greater care to ensure 
that  its  financial  interests are  fully  protected against  all  forms  of abuse.  Such is  the 
purpose of the exercise.  It  is 'surely  on  this  basis that progress can  be made  towards 
satisfying the. requirements of the Essen and Cannes European Councils . 
• 
•  • 
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